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LOANS’ IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:  
VENEZUELA AS LENDER AND BORROWER 
 by 
                                                           Leonela Medina Baez  
 
Advisor: Tomohisa Hattori  
 
Foreign aid can be allocated through grants and loans each of them having different 
repercussions in the hierarchical relations between donor/recipient and lender/borrower. This study 
focuses on the effects of bilateral loans in international relations. The relation created through 
bilateral loans is conditioned by the payment or cancellation of the debt: a client-patron 
relationship between lender and borrower remains when there is not debt payment, conversely, 
when the borrower pays off its debt to the lender on time, the relation of domination does not take 
place. However, how the relation is transformed if one state is both lender and borrower? To 
address this question Venezuela is examined as case study, country that performs the dual role of 
lender and borrower simultaneously. Through energy agreements, Venezuela provides oil loans 
under low interest rates, the possibility to pay back with goods and services and long periods to 
pay off the debts. Yet, while being a lender, the country receives loans from other states 
specifically the oil-for loan type whose payment is made by the supply of oil. Being oil the means 
to lend and borrow, the argument of this thesis is that in the particular case of Venezuela the dual 
role of lender and borrower impacts the capacity of the country to fulfill its obligations as lender 
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I. Introduction  
 
Foreign aid is a phenomenon that entails the transfer of resources between two or more 
states and whose discourse implies the development and/or maintenance of a relationship between 
the participating states. Through the transfer of resources emerges a hierarchical relation between 
donor and recipient (Hattori 2001). In order to analyze the development of such hierarchical 
relations it is necessary to understand what foreign aid is and which its conditions are. According 
to the analysis of Hattori, aid consists of two practices: gifts (grants) and loans; each practice 
creates a distinct relation between donor-recipient and lender-borrower. Gifts do not imply 
reciprocation from the recipient to the donor because no payment is needed. Since gifts are 
ambiguous in regards to the power relation, the exchange of gifts and grants is often described as 
practices of generosity and gratitude. This is what Hattori calls symbolic domination: eventually 
grants as gifts can naturalize the material inequality between donor and recipient as the natural 
order of things. Contrary to gifts, loans consist of an economic exchange where a debt is produced 
and the borrower is expected to pay back. However, as long as the borrower pays off its debt to 
the lender on time, the relation of domination does not take place but remains a possibility in case 
of delay or non-payment. Thus, loans produce a client-patron relationship between lender and 
borrower relation that remains when the borrower does not repay.  
According to James C. Scott (1972), a patron-client relation happens when an “individual 
of higher socioeconomic status (patron) uses his own influences and resources to provide 
protection or benefits, or both, for persons of lower status (client) who, for their part, reciprocate 
by offering general support and assistance, including personal services to the patron” (Scott 1972: 




patron-client relation is different from dependency theory because the dependency involves socio-
economic, ideological, cultural, and diplomatic/strategic factors; second, patron-client implies a 
degree of reciprocity because both members of the dyad give and take; and third, the patron expects 
compliance from the client in matters of crucial patronal interests. This concept denotes the relation 
that emerges between lender and borrower, who failed to repay or pay interest on time, in which 
the states are in different hierarchical positions, a reciprocation takes place, and the element of 
compliance is crucial to the success or failure of this relation.   
This conceptualization of foreign aid through the lens of gift and loans, implies three key 
points. First, a relation is created between the donor and the recipient where the lack of 
reciprocation from the latter presupposes a symbolic domination from the former. Second, the 
relation between donor and recipient, as well as lender and borrower is hierarchical because one 
state is providing the other with a resource that cannot be reciprocated. Third, there is an important 
distinction between grants and loans in which each of them has different repercussions. Even 
though it is not a unique case, Venezuela is a state that performs the four roles of donor and 
recipient, lender and borrower simultaneously. This state, especially during the Hugo Chávez’s 
administration, spent millions of dollars on grants and concessional loans to other developing 
countries. Through energy agreements, such as Petro Caribe, Venezuela provided attractive loans 
to its borrowers with low interest rates, the possibility to pay back with goods and services and 
long periods of time to pay off the debts. Yet, during the same period the country was receiving 
loans and grants from other countries. The focus of this study is on the bilateral loans borrowed 
and lent by Venezuela with attention to Chávez’s administration (1999-2013) period in which 
considerable amount of bilateral loans came into and out of the country. The thesis asks how the 




whether a dual role of lender and borrower modifies the effects of loans on Venezuela’s 
hierarchical relations with its borrowers and lenders. The argument is that in the particular case of 
Venezuela the dual role of lender and borrower impacts the capacity of the country to fulfill its 
obligations as lender which subsequently modifies Venezuela’s hierarchical relations with its 
borrowers. By the reduction of the amount of oil allocated abroad and the increased debt payments, 
effectuated with oil as well, the influence of Venezuela over its borrowers considerably 
diminished.  
In order to address this argument, this thesis will be divided into two chapters. The first 
one will analyze Venezuela as lender and the second one as borrower. In the first chapter, the first 
question to analyze is how Venezuela became a lender? To answer this question I track back when 
Venezuela began its role as a significant lender, under what circumstances, to which countries, and 
under what conditions. This provides as evidence what resources Venezuela offers (what this state 
has as surplus); who were the borrowers; and the conditionality of the loans. Second, the first 
chapter examines through what steps or processes Venezuela started lending foreign loans. As the 
previous inquiry, the approach to answer this question is to make a historical analysis of Venezuela 
as lender by looking at when this role began, under what mandates and under what economic and 
political conditions. This offers as evidence which were the developments of Venezuela as lender 
and the development of the schemes to allocate the loans. Third, the first chapter asks what type 
of loans Venezuela provides for other countries. To answer this question I analyze the loans 
agreements between Venezuela and its borrowers with a focus on the allocation of resources from 
Venezuela to other states. This analysis provides as evidence the details of the loans allocated by 
Venezuela, such as their conditionality, amount and main borrowers. Fourth, the first chapter 




themselves in their action or activities in international relations. Since the previous questions lay 
out Venezuela’s main borrowers and the countries more indebted to it, I examine the kind of 
relation that developed between them which provides as evidence if there were reciprocation 
between lender and borrower and if so, under what circumstances.  
In the second chapter, this work analyzes Venezuela as a recipient of bilateral loans. The 
following questions are addressed. First, despite the availability of financial resources due to oil 
exports, why is Venezuela continuing to receive foreign loans? To answer this question, I analyze 
the economic situation that made Venezuela request foreign loans, the amount of the loans and the 
identification of the lenders. This provides as evidence what conditions exist in this state that 
makes it a target of foreign loans. Second, what type of loans the country receives and under what 
conditions? The approach to this question is to look at the empirical data in order to categorize the 
type, amount and conditions of the loans allocated in Venezuela; and also to look at agreements in 
which Venezuela incurred as borrower. This provides as evidence the conditionality of the loans 
received by Venezuela and the justification for receiving them. Third, how Venezuela’s increasing 
debt to China transforms the hierarchical relation between the two countries, is China relationship 
with Venezuela becoming more hierarchical recently? To answer this question, I make an 
assessment of the bilateral relations between Venezuela and its main lender, which is China, 
considering the conditionality of the loans agreements between the two countries. Also, I check if 
there is absence of late payments, of interests or principal by Venezuela. This provides as evidence 
whether the loans received by Venezuela had an effect in the relation with its main lender. The 
fourth question is how do loans to Venezuela transform hierarchical relations with its borrowers. 




capacity to fulfill its role as lender. This provides as evidence whether being itself a borrower 
impacted Venezuela’s relations with its loans’ recipients.  
To these two chapter follows the general conclusions where it is examined how 



















Venezuela as Lender 
I. Introduction to The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and its Bolivarian 
Ambition  
 Before analyzing Venezuela as lender and borrower it is necessary to understand the 
political and economic context that allows this developing state to assume this dual role. Venezuela 
formally declared its independence from Spain in 1823 after over a decade of war with the colonial 
power. Among the independence leaders was Simón Bolívar who in contrast to the rest leaders 
who only ambitioned the break away from Spain, Bolívar had a continental vision by aspiring that 
the former Spanish colonies of Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela would form the Great Colombia. 
He, “envisioned a Gran Patria, incorporating all of Latin America, where all former Spanish 
colonies would establish unity of action to compete on a world stage still dominated by Europe 
and subsequently the United States” (Tinker Salas 2015: 31). However, no hemispheric integration 
took place and after independence, these three nations took their separate path where regional 
interests and personal ambitions took the center stage (Tinker Salas 2015: 31). Yet, Bolívar’s 
legacy became the center of Venezuelan identity and political discourse. Independence from the 
colonizers, democracy and regional integration became ideals proclaimed in the following 
centuries.  
Even though Venezuela was among the few representative states in Latin American during 
the 1950s, before getting to that point, the country was ruled by military leaders or better known 
as caudillos. For instance, the military president Juan Vicente Gómez ruled the nation for nearly 
three decades; Gómez left power when he died in 1935 and to him followed other military 




ousted in 1945 a three-year period initiated, known as the trienio, which ended with the coup 
against the elected president Rómulo Gallegos in 1948 (Tinker Salas 2015: 81). To ease the 
political instability, in 1951 there was a political agreement called Punto Fijo, between the leaders 
of Venezuela’s non-communist parties-Rómulo Betancourt (Democratic Action, AD), Rafael 
Caldera (Social Christian Party, COPEI), and Jovito Villalba (Union of the Democratic Republic, 
URD)-which had as objective to reduce the military efforts to exploit political divisions, promote 
political peace, respect the outcome of popular elections, and incorporate losing parties in their 
cabinets (Tinker Salas 2015: 85). After the Punto Fijo Pact, Rómulo Betancourt was elected 
president in 1958. From then on Venezuela became one of the few exceptions in Latin America 
where representative regimes were the big absent. However, successive Venezuelan governments 
were permeated with corruption and unequal distribution of wealth, especially after oil was 
discovered in 1914 and became the state’s principal source of revenue.  
During 1973-79, oil prices considerably increased which resulted in great revenues for the 
Venezuelan economy whose main exporting commodity was oil. The president during the oil 
bonanza was Carlos Andrés Pérez who governed the country in two terms 1974-79 and 1989-1993. 
However, in the second term oil prices declined leaving the economy with deficits (Romero 2010; 
Trinkunas 2002; Tinker Salas 2015). In 1976, the oil industry was nationalized and the Venezuelan 
state assumed an active role in international affairs. For instance, Pérez re-established the 
diplomatic relations with Cuba; his administration donated a ship to Bolivia, “in support of that 
landlocked nation’s aspiration to regain access;” he opposed the Somoza dictatorship in Nicaragua 
and supported the sovereignty over the Panama Canal1. Pérez proposed the project of La Gran 
                                                          
1 Romero, Simon. 2010. “Carlos Andres Perez, Former President of Venezuela, Dies at 88,” New York Times, 





Venezuela (The Great Venezuela), which encompassed “flush of foreign reserves, the exploitation 
of bauxite and aluminum deposits, expand petrochemical production, push forward construction 
of the Caracas subway, modernize the international airports, and expand the Caracas subway, 
along with a host of other projects” (Tinker Salas 2015: 103). In order to develop these plans, 
Pérez’s administration borrowed from foreign creditors, with the assumption that oil prices would 
continue to increase. Venezuela's external debt rose from USD$0.7 billion in 1974 to USD$6.1 
billion in 19782. At the end of the 1970s and the beginnings of the 1980s, falling oil prices, capital 
outflows and foreign debt payments destabilized Venezuelan economy which was reflected in a 
deficit of US$4.7 billion by 1988 (Haggerty 1993: 84). The price of oil began its steady decline in 
1982, which deprived the Venezuelan government of revenues to finance its political model of 
redistributing the wealth to maintain political stability; the “foreign debt climbed past USD$33 
billion, over 80% of which was owed by the state…inequality between rich and poverty 
widened…as the number of Venezuelans living in critical poverty expanded from 32.6% at the 
beginning of 1980s to 53.7% in 1989” (Trinkunas 2002: 50). During Pérez’s second term in 1989, 
the state borrowed USD$4.5 billion from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), measure that 
was accompanied by an austerity program that included spending cuts and raising gasoline prices; 
in February of 1989, these measures triggered a social riot called El Caracazo in which hundreds 
of civilians died3.  
Even though during the 1990 and 1991 the country experimented economic growth, “it 
occurred amidst increasing income inequality, declining real wages,” and government corruption 
                                                          
2 2011. “Venezuela’s Oil King: Carlos Andres Perez,” The Economist (US), 8 January. 
3 Romero, Simon. 2010. “Carlos Andres Perez, Former President of Venezuela, Dies at 88,” New York Times, 





which triggered more social turmoil (Trinkunas 2002: 42). Moreover, the 1990s was a lost decade 
for Venezuela since it was “marked by recession, high inflation, steady devaluation of the 
currency, popular unrest, the decay of many government services, and the nearly collapse of the 
financial sector” (Trinkumas 2002: 42). Yet, the two failed coups attempts of 1992 against Pérez, 
were the major destabilizing events of that decade. The coup attempts were performed by The 
Revolutionary Bolivarian Movement 2004, whose leader was Lieutenant Colonel Hugo Chávez, 
who afterwards was imprisoned for two years.  Chávez and his comrades justified their actions on 
social justice and putting an end to the governments of the elites. Giving speeches from jail, Chávez 
became a recognized leader at the national level (Tinker Salas 2015: 123). In 1998 Chávez, the 
military officer who wanted to take office under unconstitutional means, was elected as 
Venezuelan President. After assuming power in 1999, Venezuela under Chávez began an era under 
the umbrella of the ‘Bolivarian Revolution’ and the ‘Fifth Republic.’ Chávez governed until his 
death on April of 2013, the presidency of Venezuela was assumed by Nicolás Maduro who was 






                                                          
4 This movement was formed in 1983 by junior army officers who developed a populist and nationalist belief based 
in their selective ideas of Simón Bolívar and other independence heroes. They were also influenced by “their 




II. Literature Review 
Venezuela is a country that has received broad scholarly attention due to its democratic 
exceptionalism during the 1950s and 1960s, its oil-based economy and its regional leadership 
which intensified during the 14 years of the Chávez administration. Most of these studies recognize 
the allocation of resources abroad as a means to influence the international order and to create an 
alternative international economic order. Thus, in order to analyze the role of Venezuela as lender, 
and its subsequent hierarchical relation with other states, concepts of hegemony, counter-
hegemony and soft-power need to be tackled.  
Hegemony is a concept used to conceptualize the international hierarchical position of the 
states and the relation of power between them. Robert Cox uses the hegemony concept informed 
by Antonio Gramsci to explain the hegemonic order in international relations. In his article 
“Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations,” Cox poses as main inquiries, what is an 
enlarged meaning of hegemony? How Gramsci’s definition of hegemony at the national level can 
be transferred to the international order? After defining hegemony, what does counter-hegemony 
mean? To approach these questions the author analysis Gramsci’s definitions of hegemony 
emphasizing Gramsci’s theoretical and political context, then Cox takes those definitions to 
complement (or even substitute) the mainstream definition of hegemony used in international 
relations. To build his argument, Cox uses as evidence the definition by Gramsci of the following 
concepts, which he later applies to the international order realm. First, Gramsci applies the concept 
of hegemony to the leadership of the bourgeoisie over the rest of the social classes; Gramsci’s 
interpretation of Machiavelli and the image of power as a centaur, Cox asserts that this relation 
between the concept of power from Machiavelli and the concept of hegemony liberates hegemony 




dominance and subordination, including relations of world order” (Cox 1993: 52). Cox argues that 
the movement towards hegemony according to Gramsci is a ‘passage from the structure to the 
sphere of the complex superstructures,’ which Cox interprets as “passing from the specific interests 
of a group or class to the building of institutions and elaboration of ideologies,” where those 
institutions and ideologies take an universal form and will supplement some of the needs of the 
subordinate group without undermining the leadership of the ruling class (Cox 1993: 57).  Cox 
uses this interpretation to explain two things: first, that powerful, meaning wealthy, nations 
penetrate the economic life of the subordinate countries which are dependent on those wealthy 
nations; and second, that the powerful nations underwent an economic and social revolution that 
transformed their states and then had a spillover effect that extended to the international level. 
After analyzing Gramsci’s concepts regarding hegemony, Cox discard the conventional use of 
hegemony in international relations, which refers to the dominance of one country over the others. 
The author asserts that this definition is distanced from Gramsci’s concept.  
Cox’s main argument is that “hegemony at the international level is thus not merely an 
order among states,” hegemony implies an order within the world economy where the dominant 
economic practice infiltrates into the other nations which become entangled and subordinate to 
such mode of production. Moreover, the author asserts that world hegemony encompasses an 
economic, social and political structure; hegemony cannot be only one of these structures, and it 
has to be all three. Hence, for Cox a counter-hegemonic practice needs structural changes that can 
only begin to take place at the national level before entering into the international order.  
Giovanni Arrighi also analyzes Gramsci’s theories in his article “The Three Hegemonies 
of Historical Capitalism.” Arrighi explores the inquiries of hegemony and world economy, but his 




realm in order to be considered a hegemon? To tackle this question the author makes a historical 
analysis of the rise as hegemonies of the United Provinces, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States. In the same line of Cox, Arrighi discard the conventional political realist use of the 
hegemony concept, and he also uses Gramsci’s hegemony interpretation. At the core of his 
argument, like Gramsci, Arrighi defines hegemony as the combination of coercion and consent, 
where coercion implies the threat of the use of force whereas consent implies moral leadership. 
Arrighi’s main argument is that a nation becomes hegemonic when it leads the system of states in 
its desired direction, “and, in doing so, is perceived as pursuing a universal interest” (Arrighi 1993: 
150). The author concludes that the three nations that he used as case study did not become 
hegemons only because of their military capability or their ability to command scarce resource, 
rather it was because of their capability to use their resources to solve the issues that emerged in 
the state-system. The author argues that a state can become world hegemonic if it has the moral 
leadership and thus credibility to “be the motor force of a universal expansion of the collective 
power of rulers vis-à-vis subjects” (Arrighi 1993: 151).  
The means to exercise power in the international system can take the form of hard power, 
which is the traditional use of coercion or it can be through soft-power or co-optive power as 
conceptualized by Joseph S. Nye. In his article “Soft Power,” Nye argues that in a post-Cold War 
world the United States, as remaining superpower, has to worry more about the new challenges 
that it will face to exercise its power than about the challengers to its hegemonic position. Through 
the lens of balance of power, Nye poses the question to “what extent it [United States] will be able 
to control the political environment and get other countries to do what it wants?” To approach this 
question, Nye first refers to the definition of power which  “means the ability to do things and 




commonly define power as the possession of population, territory, natural resources, economic 
size, military forces and political stability” (Nye 1990: 154). Then he argues that traditional or 
hard power cannot be ignored, however, the use of the soft-power will become relevant in the 
contemporary world. This is mainly due to five trends that he enumerates as: “economic 
interdependence, transnational actors, nationalism in weak states, the spread of technology, and 
changing political issues” (Nye 1990: 160). These trends respond to what he calls “diffusion of 
power” that refers to when power is slipping out of the hands of the state and non-state actors are 
becoming more and more influential. Moreover, Nye asserts that in the after-Cold War era the 
definition of power is missing its emphasis on military force, whereas the factors of education, 
technology and economic growth are becoming more significant.  
Finally, Nye defines soft-power and contrast it with hard power. Referring to soft-power 
as a second trend, he asserts that “a state may achieve the outcomes it prefers in world politics 
because other states want to follow it or have agreed to a situation that produces such effects” (Nye 
1990: 166). The principal achievement of co-optive or soft-power is that one country gets other 
countries to want what it wants, in contrast to the traditional hard power that order others what to 
do. Nye argues that if a state can make its power seem legitimate at the eyes of the rest, it will 
encounter less resistance to its wishes; it can establish international norms consistent with its 
society; and “if it can support institutions that make other states wish to channel or limit their 
activities in ways the dominant state prefers, it may be spared the costly exercise of coercive or 
hard power” (Nye 1990: 170). The instruments to exercise such power include diplomatic notes 
through economic threats to military coercion; and the resources recur to cultural and ideological 
attraction as well as rules and institutions of international regimes. Nye gives as example how the 




international economy, such as the International Monetary Fund and the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade, tend to embody liberal, free-market principles that coincide in large measure 
with American society and ideology” (Nye 1990: 168).  
The regional and cooperation agreements implemented by Venezuela, especially ALBA 
and Petro Caribe, has received ample scholarly attention in which concepts of counter-hegemony, 
south-south cooperation and soft-power are predominant.  
In his article “Building a Global South Coalition,” Sean Burges asks which regional 
leadership strategy is more successful in terms of achieving its purposes, if the one implemented 
by Venezuela under Hugo Chávez or the one carried out by Lula Da Silva in Brazil. To approach 
this question the author makes a comparison of the foreign policy strategies implemented by Brazil 
with a neo-structuralist strategy5, and Venezuela’s strategies which had an official development 
assistance (ODA) approach. Burges explains that Venezuela’s strategy seeks to shape the global 
political economy through a regionalist approach based in the ideologies of Simon Bolivar and the 
country’s oil resources. The author asserts that at the core of Venezuela’s foreign policy is the 
Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA) agreement which was created in 2004 as an 
alternative to the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). Moreover, Burges states that “in many 
respects Chávez's ALBA can be read as a fuzzy attempt at a counter hegemonic project in the 
Coxian interpretation of Gramsci's war of position” (Burges 2007: 1346). Although Venezuela 
sponsored energy agreements such as Petro Andina and Petro Sur, Petro Caribe is the one that has 
                                                          
5 According to Burges, the neo-structuralism is based in a Keynesian tradition in which the state has a role in the 
regulation and direction of the national economy. Even though neo-structuralism can appear similar to 
neoliberalism, the difference between the two school of thoughts is the space, pace and sequencing role of the state 
to intervene in the national economy, “moreover, the radical retraction of the state from the national economy 
advocated by neoliberalism as the surest avenue to freedom is rejected by neo-structuralism as being antithetical to 




the ODA component. Created in 2005, Petro Caribe commits Venezuela to provide “US$17 billion 
in subsidized oil billing over the next 10 years at the rate of 200,000 barrels of oil per day” (Burges 
2007: 1347). According to Burges, the ODA function of Petro Caribe comes into play in the terms 
of purchase: “reports suggest that Petro Caribe oil will effectively be USD$6 under market costs, 
bringing a region-wide annual total savings of USD$50 million” (Burges 2007: 1347). In contrast, 
Brazil’s strategy is reluctant to adopt the humanist ODA rhetoric and in assuming constant 
expenditure to gain regional leadership. Instead Brazil opted for a market-oriented system, which 
according to the author is a more sustainable strategy at the long run. Burges asserts that Brazil 
assumed a neo-structuralist approach whose corollary is that the state retains an important role in 
guiding the direction and development of the national economy (Burges 2007: 1349). Brazil’s 
regional strategies had a combination of state and private corporate efforts, such as the case of the 
Competitive Import Substitution Programme (CISP) was launched in 2005, which had the 
objective to substitute intra-continental products for extra-continental imports. Also, Brazil was 
part of the India - Brazil - South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA), whose “efforts began with a 
range of foreign policy issues of mutual concern, particularly the reform and expansion of the UN 
Security Council, and extended to dealing with the challenges of globalization and sustainable 
development, health care, confronting terrorism and promoting social development” (Burges 2007: 
1351). 
 The outcomes of those actions are the evidence to prove Burges’ argument which is that 
Brazil’s neo-structuralist vision is more successful in attaining its purposes at the long run than 
Venezuela’s foreign development aid approach. Burges asserts that even though the countries that 
are part of the ALBA and the Petro Caribe agreements “happily accept Venezuela’s aid, provide 




Bolivarian ALBA agenda,” however, “all this is done only when it reflects the interests of the 
country in question, representing a large roadblock in Chávez's attempts to position Venezuela as 
an international leader, ostensibly at the head of a counter-hegemonic bloc opposing the neoliberal 
global order” (Burges 2007: 1353). In contrast, “Brazil's neo-structuralist approach is predicated 
on the operation of markets, which become a device that the government can use for its policy 
goals by offering the right incentives and creating attractive conditions for investment… it is the 
Brazilian vision and approach that appears to be gaining the most traction in the rest of the region” 
(Burges 2007: 1355).  
Through the perspective of Venezuelan foreign policy, in his article “The New Balancing 
Act: International Relations Theory and Venezuela’s Foreign Policy,” Mark Eric Williams makes 
three arguments: first, that even though Venezuelan foreign policy is antithetical to the United 
States’ foreign interests, it has an American style used by the Venezuelan government to advance 
the interests of Chávez’s regime. Second, the author asserts that analyzing Venezuelan’s foreign 
policy only through the lens of Chávez obscures the broader international context that helps 
understand the country’s behavior in the international stage. And third, that Venezuelan foreign 
policy is theoretically understandable but not revolutionary per se, especially since Venezuela 
reflects what is called soft-balancing power that is when a weak state uses non-military means to 
advance its interests and to deter a more powerful country. The approach used by the author is to 
outline the concept of soft-balancing and then “address those aspects of Venezuela’s foreign policy 
the concept illustrates” (Williams 2011: 260).  
By focusing on the implications of the actual agreement, Daniele Benzi analyses the Petro 
Caribe treaty as a South-South cooperation tool in her article “Economic Geopolitics and 




government of Venezuela in 2005, which initiated with the participation of 14 countries and later 
on expanded to 19 countries of the Caribbean and Central America. According to the terms of the 
agreement, Venezuela would sell oil to the participating countries under concessional prices, low 
interest rates and extended periods to pay off the debt. The main questions posed by Benzi are: 
what are the intentions of Venezuela with the implementation of this agreement? What are the 
positive and negative effects for the participating nations? To respond these questions the author 
makes an assessment of Petro Caribe as a South-South cooperation tool in order to acknowledge 
its benefits and counterproductive effects to both Venezuela and the recipient countries. As 
evidence Benzi enumerates the aspects of the agreement that concord and also contradict with the 
South-South cooperation concept. She points out how the conditions of the agreement result in 
benefits for the recipient nations, especially since they don’t have to give money up-front, they 
have a low-interest rate, and some states can make the payments also in products and services. 
However, as downside the author references the cases of corruption and fraud in the recipient 
nations which can distort the ‘solidarity’ intentions of the agreement; and also how measures of 
environmental sustainability are not addressed by the agreement. Benzi emphasizes that scholars 
tend to leave aside the main purpose of the Venezuelan diplomatic strategy which is to break the 
monopoly of the transnational oil corporations and rearrange the relationship between them and 
the state (Benzi 2013:70). She concludes that Petro Caribe is a cooperation project that 
encompasses the economic and geopolitical balance of the Latin American region, which despite 
being under the umbrella of South-South Cooperation deals with the vicious aspects of traditional 
foreign aid treaties. 
Assuming as well the analysis of the agreements and its implications, in her article “The 




comparison between the trade treaty Bolivarian Alternative for our American Nations (ALBA) and 
the Petro Caribe agreement in order to address the question whether the increment of regional 
agreements actually serve to unify Latin America. Her approach to answer this question is to 
analyze the interests that the recipient nations had to adhere to these agreements. Her answer is 
that the great amount of regional agreements serve more to fragment than to unite the Latin 
American region. Asymmetries among and within the countries reveal the incapacity of acting 
under the same page. Altmann Borbón emphasizes that countries tend to adhere more to 
agreements of economic opportunities rather than agreements of ideological nature. The main 
evidence to prove this argument is that ALBA, which had an ideological base, did not have as 
many participating nations as Petro Caribe, which differed from ALBA in the economic benefits 
that offered to the borrowing states.  
By examining the Venezuelan agreements from the recipient nations’ perspective, in the 
article “Responses to Venezuelan Petro-Politics in the Greater Caribbean,” Anthony P. Maingot 
poses as main inquiry which are the responses of the Greater Caribbean to Venezuela’s Petro-
Politics. The author approaches this question by examining Venezuela’s policies from the 
Caribbean nations’ perspectives by establishing their socio-economic context and the strategic 
reasons for which they will join or reject Venezuela’s proposals. As evidence he describes the 
opposition from Trinidad & Tobago, island that has its own oil reserves and which sees Venezuela 
more as a threat than as an ally. Barbados, because it has a close relationship with Trinidad & 
Tobago also refused to join Petro Caribe. In contrast, Jamaica which is oil dependent joined Petro 
Caribe in order to purchase the resource under favorable conditions. Maingot concludes that each 
country reacts differently to Venezuela and its ‘Bolivarian Revolution,’ depending on their 




In the same line as Maingot, by analyzing the Venezuelan agreement’s from the recipient 
countries perspective, Ronald Sanders asks in his article “Venezuela in the Caribbean,” whether 
the small states that benefit from the Venezuela’s loan scheme for oil will eventually respond to 
the Venezuelan agenda. His answer is that the Caribbean will pursue their interests despite the 
warnings from the United States and the aid provided by Venezuela. To approach his inquiry the 
author analyzes the traditional relationship between the Caribbean Community (CARICOM)’s 
member states and the United States, on the one hand, and the emerging relationship with 
Venezuela, on the other. The author also analyses the role of the CARICOM6 nations in 
international organizations such as the United Nations (UN) and in the Organization of American 
States (OAS). Sanders begins his analysis by establishing that prior to 2005 (the year in which 
Petro Caribe is implemented), Venezuela and the CARICOM’s members had little bilateral 
relations. He argues that it is clear that the Petro Caribe initiative was an instrument of Chávez to 
weaken the presence of the United States in the region. Nonetheless Chávez also “recognizes that 
CARICOM countries represent almost half of the 34 votes in the OAS, where debates on the 
hemispheric political situation are played out; and they are a solid bloc in the Latin American and 
Caribbean group at the UN. If he could get them on his side, his policies could influence 
significantly the discourse of these bodies” (Sanders 2007: 467). However, even though Venezuela 
received full support from CARICOM countries in 2006 when Venezuela challenged Guatemala 
for a seat in the UN Security Council, Sanders asserts that there is no real event since the 
implementation of ALBA and Petro Caribe that could measure the influence of Venezuela on the 
Caribbean. Sanders concludes that the CARICOM countries will not adopt the Venezuelan agenda, 
                                                          
6 The CARICOM is composed of the following members: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, 
Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, St Kitts-Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, 
Trinidad and Tobago, and the British colony, Montserrat (Caribbean Community. 2011. “CARICOM Member 




especially the effort of deterring the United States. He asserts that these Caribbean nations have 
an intertwined relation with the United States and at “several levels is much deeper than the 
recently established links with Venezuela” (Sanders 2007: 474). Moreover, Sanders emphasizes 
that Venezuela and the United States have a mutual economic dependence as well, since the United 
States is the principal importer of Venezuelan oil. Hence, it is difficult to ask the other states to 
break ties with the North if Venezuela itself cannot.  
The previously reviewed authors bring out key points about Venezuela’s behavior in the 
international community. For instance, Burges and Sanders emphasize the counter-hegemonic 
intentions of Venezuela through the implementation of the agreements ALBA-TCP and Petro 
Caribe. Both authors, along with Benzi, recognize that these agreements (especially Petro Caribe) 
are highly attractive for the participating nations, yet, its benefits are not enough to advance 
Chávez’s agenda in the region. Maingot, Sanders and Burges also emphasize that each country is 
going to respond to its own interests, despite of their participation in Venezuela’s agreements. This 
implies that Petro Caribe and ALBA do not have the enough elements to change international 
behavior, hence, the allocation of grants and loans from Venezuela to other states by itself does 
not determine the kind of relationship between the donor/recipient and lender/borrower, rather the 
relationship is going to be conditioned by the interests of the recipients and borrowers.  
Following Hattori (2001), even though Venezuela allocates both grants and loans, this 
study will treat them as two distinct practices. Due to the constraints of time and space, this chapter 
will focus on the loans because grants constitute a different practice with a different causal 
mechanism. In order to understand the changes in power relations as the effect of the role of 
Venezuela as lender, the following four questions will be examined in the rest of the chapter: how 




loans? What type of loans Venezuela provides for other countries? How the hierarchical relations 
between Venezuela as lender and its borrowers manifest themselves?  
III. Venezuela’s Loan Practices 
III-A. Venezuela’s Consolidation as International Lender 
Most reviewed authors assert that Chávez and oil is the binomial that explains the capacity 
of Venezuela to allocate loans abroad. However, Venezuela has served as lender decades before 
the arrival of Chávez to power, yet, oil revenues has been the principal factor behind the allocation 
of resources abroad. Venezuela became a lender because of the wealth that came from their oil 
production and exports. Moreover, in order to protect that source of revenue, Venezuelan 
governments have pursued an international agenda that includes the vision of regional integration, 
creating independence for the Latin American region and the impetus to be an international 
influencer. 
Oil reserves were discovered in Venezuela in 1914, from then on the country political 
economy and international relations revolved around its principal buyers that were European 
countries and the United States and these countries’ colonies (Claim and Maingot 2007: 3). In 
1943, Isaías Medina Angarita became the first Venezuelan president to travel abroad by visiting 
Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, the United States and also establishing relations with the Soviet 
Union (Tinker Salas 2015: 78). By the time of Medina Angarita’s regime the oil companies were 
on British and American hands which were reluctant to change the status quo, however, fearing 
nationalization (that already had happened in Mexico) the United States preferred to negotiate and 
gave more administrative positions to Venezuelans. Medina Angarita’s main legacy was the oil 




This law allowed the country to begin a process to increment the revenues received by the 
exploitation of oil7. 
With the government of Rómulo Gallegos in 1958, the state of Venezuela visualized having 
an international role in petroleum politics. However, Gallegos’ government was overthrown by a 
military coup, thus the ‘Bolivarian’ foreign policy returned with the election of Rómulo Betancourt 
in 1959. This ‘Bolivarian’ approach implied a rhetoric of Latin American integration and a 
hemispheric revolution. Betancourt’s oil policies followed the previous regimes by refusing to 
nationalize the industry. However, because of the decreasing oil prices in 1959 the Venezuelan 
government started to consider the outcomes of increasing competition between oil-producing 
countries. In 1960, the Venezuelan Minister of Hydrocarbons Juan Pablo Pérez Alfonzo met with 
other Middle East producers and that same year the group founded the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC), with Venezuela as a founding member (Tinker Salas 2015: 97).  
Pedro-Pablo Kuczynski notes that by the 1970s the Venezuelan economy had a high degree 
of dualism: “the oil and gas industry (including refining), which provides only about 37,000 jobs 
directly, in 1975 generated 77% of the central’s government’s current revenue, 96% of 
merchandise export earnings, and 29% of gross domestic product (GDP). At the other extreme, 
agriculture which employs about 680,000 persons or approximately 19% of labor force generated 
only about 5% of GNP” (Kuczynski 1977: 49). This is shown in the following table where can be 
noted how the petroleum, gas and mining sector increased its GDP% composition from 19.0 in 
                                                          
7 Gaceta Oficial de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela. 2001. Decreto con Fuerza de Ley Orgánica de 





1970 to 38.4 in 1974, while the agricultural sector diminished from 7.0 to 4.6 during the same 
period.  
Table 1. Venezuelan Sector Composition in GDP% 1970-1974 
 In Current Prices 
 
In 1965 Prices Growth rates in constant 
1970 1974 1974 1968 prices  
1970-74 
Sector Composition of GDP 
(%) 
100.0 100.0 100.0 4.2% 
Agriculture 7.0 4.6 6.8 3.7% 
Petroleum, gas & mining 19.0 38.4 14.3 -3.4% 
Petroleum refining 3.8 10.5 2.3 -6.5% 
Other manufacturing 12.2 8.8 14.0 7.4% 
Construction 3.9 3.3 4.8 10.2% 
Other (services) 54.1 34.4 57.8 6.5% 
Source: Kuczynski 1977: 84.   
However, oil as the main exporting commodity of the country also meant an economy 
highly dependable on oil prices and the country’s investment in the oil industry. According to 
Maria Antonia Moreno and Cameron A. Shelton (2014), there were three oil price periods that 
dictated Venezuela’s policy towards the oil industry. In table 2 can be noted how the Venezuelan 
policy of investment on the oil industry was highly related to the oil prices: low oil prices reflected 
low investment and this resulted in reduced oil productivity.  









of growth by 
Period 
Characterization 




11.22 1.77 0.158 8.39 Low level, low 
volatility.  




44.96 8.31 0.185 10.18 High Level, 
moderate 
volatility. 
Production and revenues per capita 
are falling due to low investment 




19.77 4.17 0.211 19.80 Moderate level, 
high volatility. 
Relaxation of taxes and limited 
return to private investment lead to 
a modest expansion in production.  





 Kuczynski asserts that the largest increase in international oil prices came at the end of 
1973, being the important measure of this increase “the average revenue per barrel exported 
collected by the Central Government, which rose from USD$1.65 in 1972 to USD$2.29 in 1973, 
USD$8.75 in 1974 and USD$9.43 in 1975” (Kuczynski 1977: 53). As table 3 shows, the biggest 
surplus happened in 1974 at the hike of the oil prices, however just two years later the country had 
a deficit. This is emphasized by Kuczynski, who asserts that from this statistics what mostly stand 
out is “the trend in current fiscal revenues, rising by 160% from 1973 to 1974, and then declining 
as oil output fell, initially slowly in 1975 and more rapidly in 1976” (Kuczynski 1977: 54). 
Table 3. Summary of Central Government Finances, 1972-76 (Billions of Bolivares at 
current prices). 
 Prelim. Estimate 
 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
Current 
Revenues 
12.5 16.4 42.8 41.0 37.0 
Current 
Expenditures 
10.4 11.5 16.5 20.5 22.0 
A. Current 
Surplus 
2.1 4.9 26.3 20.5 15.0 
Transfer to 
Special Funds 
- - 14.1 9.0 3.5 
Other Capital 
Expenditures 




3.6 4.8 25.5 21.0 17.5 
C. Surplus or 
Deficit (A-B) 
-1.5 0.1 0.8 -0.5 -2.5 
Source: Kuczynski 1977: 54 
 
  In 1974, under the administration of Pérez, the government initiated the nationalization of 
Venezuelan’s oil company Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A.-PDVSA8. Moreover, “Pérez used the 
                                                          
8 Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA). 2005. “De la privatizacion a la nacionalizacion de la industria petrolera en 
Venezuela” [From Privitization to Nacionalization of the Oil Industry in Venezuela]. http://www.pdvsa.com/ (March 




country’s growing oil wealth to resuscitate the Bolivarian dream of hemispheric unity” (Clem and 
Maingot 2011: 5). Pérez’s regime made financial contributions to initiatives in Latin America and 
the Caribbean (which will be explained in the next section) that included bilateral agreements and 
contributions to international organizations. For instance, in 1974-75, the Venezuelan government 
allocated US$ 500 million to the World Bank, two other USD$500 million to the Inter-American 
Development Bank and to the International Monetary Fund respectively (Clem and Maingot 2011: 
5). Clem and Maingot point out that Pérez foreign policy also included geopolitical initiatives that 
were against the current at that time. Venezuela supported the Rio Treaty which was part of a 
larger effort to reintegrate Cuba into the Organization of American States; this country also 
supported and gave funds to the Latin American Economic System9 (SELA) which included Cuba 
but excluded U.S. membership (Clem and Maingot 2011: 5).  
 As noted above, the international activism directly assumed by Venezuelan presidents 
paved the way for the international role of the country during the Chávez era. By the time Chávez 
arrived to power in 1999 there was a precedence of Venezuelan governments using the oil revenues 
to allocate resources abroad in order to be an influential force in the international community. 
Since the 1970s the country was demonstrating certain international independence by being part 
of agreements that did not relate to the hegemonic states, such as being a founder member of the 
OPEC, being part of the Rio Treaty and providing funds to SELA. As will be noted in the next 
                                                          
9 Sistema Economico Latinoamericano, is a regional intergovernmental organization created in 1975 through the 
Panama Agreement with its headquarters in Caracas, Venezuela. Its purpose is to promote a system of consultancy 
and coordination to agree on positions and strategies common for Latin America and the Caribbean. SELA is 
integrated by 27 countries, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, 
Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, México, Nicaragua, Panamá, Paraguay, 
Peru, Dominican Republic, Suriname, Trinidad & Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela. (Sistema Economico 
Latinoamericano y del Caribe (SELA). 2015. “Que es SELA?” [What is SELA?], http://www.sela.org/es/que-es-el-





section, during the Chávez’s administration, Venezuela’s allocation of resources abroad intensified 
and the Bolivarian Revolution became the core of the country’s course of action and discourse.  
III-B Venezuela’s Progression as an International Lender  
 
The allocation of loans by Venezuela respond to the role of the oil industry in its economy 
and the leadership initiatives assumed by its governments. The crucial period of 1974-75 that 
translated into an oil bonanza marked the beginning of Venezuela as an international lender. 
During Pérez’s first term in the mid-1970s Venezuela provided international assistance without 
formal schemes; however, this began to change with the energy cooperation agreement of San José 
in 1980 and with the subsequent creation of more formal regional agreements and international 
platforms to allocate loans abroad.  
 As noted before, by 1960 oil was the main commodity of the Venezuelan economy, thus, 
the state’s interest in assuring its high international prices and collecting the revenues locally. In 
1960, the OPEC was created as a permanent intergovernmental organization. Its creation took 
place at the Baghdad Conference on September of 1960, being the five founding members Iran, 
Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. The principal objective of this organization is to “co-
ordinate and unify petroleum policies among Member Countries, in order to secure fair and stable 
prices for petroleum producers; an efficient, economic and regular supply of petroleum to 
consuming nations; and a fair return on capital to those investing in the industry10”. In 1973 there 
were two events in the OPEC framework that “heralded the advent of expensive oil and a price 
volatility inherent with oil becoming commoditized, politicized and engulfed in an aura of 
                                                          
10 Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). 2016. “Brief History.” 




geopolitical sensitivity” (Chalabi 2010: 1). That year ministers of the Arab petroleum-producing 
countries decided, in support of Egypt’s war with Israel, to reduce the production of oil in order to 
create political pressure on America that had a pro-Israel policy. After this decision, individual 
OPEC members “repeatedly pressed the multinational oil companies for new price and profit 
concessions and a share in their operations. The price of a barrel of crude, which was below 
USD$2.00 a barrel in the 1960s, rose quickly. Venezuela, for example, ordered the companies to 
raise prices four times, up to USD$4.44 a barrel, between January and October 1973” (Rabe 1982: 
180). Even though the OPEC measures to raise oil prices benefited Venezuela, Stephen Rabe notes 
that between 1970 and 1973 Venezuela did not play a predominant role within the OPEC which 
was due to Venezuela’s declining international position in the oil business. Moreover, during the 
embargo Venezuela continued to export oil to the United States, however, “neither the Nixon nor 
the Ford administration thanked the Latin nation for increasing its exports of oil to the United 
States” (Rabe 1982: 184).  
During the 1970s, the Venezuelan state sought the nationalization of oil companies, process 
that began in 1974. This created a government budget surplus11, due to the combination of oil 
production, exportation and high prices12. This was the decade when Venezuela evolved from 
being a recipient of loans and foreign aid to be a donor and lender (Rabe 1982: 190). Kuczynski 
asserts that during 1974-75 Venezuela assumed two approaches to international assistance, one 
through bilateral cooperation agreements and the other through contributions to international 
                                                          
11 See Table 3. 
12 According to a study made by Sachs and Warner, during the oil boom in the 1970s, “Venezuelan growth was 
0.77% lower due to natural resource intensity. Taken literally, this implies that at the end of the 20-year period in 
1990, Venezuelan per-capita GDP was about 14% lower than it would have been if Venezuelan had no natural 





organizations. Yet, Kuczynski notes that even though Venezuela gave direct assistance to Central 
American and Caribbean governments, its major contributions were to international organizations 
such as the World Bank, the IMF and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) as it is shown 
in table 4. For instance, “disbursements of public sector lending abroad in 1974, made up largely 
of the loans to the IMF and the World Bank, totaled about US$850 million, or 14% of the current 
account surplus” (Kuczynski 1977: 63). However, Venezuela’s assistance diminished in 1975 
when its balance-of-payments surplus became smaller (Kuczynski 1977: 62). 
Table 4. Venezuelan International Assistance to Multilateral Organizations 1974-1975 
Recipient Institution Committed 
Amount 
Year/Specifications 
IMF Oil Facility 
 
US$540 million 1974 
US$4303 million were disbursed at the end of the 
same year through the Venezuelan Central Bank. 





Channeled through The Venezuelan Investment Fund 






Inter-American Development Bank US$500 million. 1975 
A commitment over a five year period to establish a 
trust fund. 
Caribbean Development Bank 
(CDB); the Andean Development 
Corporation; Central American 
Bank of Economic Integration. 
US $150 million. 1975 
This amount resulted from the sign of various 
commitments with these three institutions. 





This loan was for developmental programs, and gave 
informal assurance of assistance to Honduras’ efforts 
to recover from the destruction of Hurricane Fifi. 
Source: Kuczynski 1977: 63.  
 Regarding, Venezuela’s bilateral loans and assistance, John D. Martz asserts that the 
“major pillar to be erected was a willingness to employ petroleum earnings in the conduct of 
international relations,” which grew during the first months of the Perez’ administration in 1974 
                                                          
13 The Special Drawing Right (SDR) is an international reserve asset, created by the IMF in 1969 in the context of 
the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system (International Monetary Fund. 2016. “Factsheet: Special Drawing 





(Martz 1977: 167). The Venezuelan government used two mechanisms to disburse its assistance, 
which were cash-loan plan and reimbursement for fuel purchased by consumers. As it is detailed 
in table 5, these two mechanisms targeted the neighboring countries of the Caribbean, Central and 
South America. These countries benefited of lower interest rates than the market, cheaper oil prices 
and extended periods to make the repayments which meant that Venezuela was subsidizing these 
oil exports.  














Importers would pay $6 per barrel-roughly 50% of the market 
price. The remainder, in local currency, would be placed as a 
virtual loan into the respective countries’ development banks for 
domestic reinvestment. Interest was set at 8%, lower than the 
rates from international development funds, while repayment 
could extend over 25 years. Although the full price of the oil 
would eventually fall upon the importers, the burden would thus 
be extended over a lengthy period, during which time the 












In 1975, Venezuela promised to sell Jamaica petroleum for its 
industrial program under cash-loan terms similar to those already 
extended to Central America. Payment would be set at 50% of 
the world price, with the remainder to be made in local currency 










Peru would pay Ecuador approximately half the cost of its daily 
25,000 barrel imports. Ecuador would receive the remainder 
from Venezuela, which would eventually be repaid by Peru. As a 
consequence, Venezuela was spared the relatively uneconomical 
shipment of small quantities to Peru; the Ecuadorean petroleum 
industry would benefit; and Peru would have lower transportation 
costs. This deferred payment was estimated at some $100 











A similar agreement was signed in 1976 involving Cuba and the 
Soviet Union, through which Venezuelan oil would be shipped to 
Cuba while the Russians in exchange would supply Western 
European customers. Both Venezuela and the Soviet Union were 
thus spared major transportation expense. 
Cuba and Soviet 
Union. 





 However, despite this international economic assistance to Central America and the 
Caribbean, Rabe asserts that Venezuela did not assume a confrontational role against the United 
States. Moreover, Rabe emphasizes that Venezuela “contributed many of its petrodollars to 
international assistance, as the United States urged all OPEC members to do…wanting to prove 
the sincerity of its commitments to the Third World and also to invest its petrodollars abroad to 
prevent ruinous inflation at home, Venezuela gave in 1975, for example, 12% of its GDP to foreign 
aid” (Rabe 1977: 190). According to Maurice J. Williams (1976), after the increase of oil prices in 
1974 the development assistance of the OPEC countries augmented under the discourse of helping 
developing countries handle the high oil prices14. Williams notes that despite the OPEC’s members 
consensus on providing international assistance their different interests and oil production would 
drive them in different directions. For instance, “Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates 
and Qatar will run major surpluses on their current balance of payments well beyond 1980, and 
they have important interests to pursue on behalf of the Arab world. Nigeria and Indonesia with 
small proven oil reserves will not have major returns. In between are Algeria, Iran, Iraq and 
Venezuela-with ambitious programs for development which appear likely to overtake their surplus 
oil earnings in the next few years” (Williams 1976: 316).    
As noted before, the existence of the OPEC nor the nationalization process guaranteed the 
wealth surplus that Venezuela enjoyed during the 1970s. Even though in the following decades 
the prices recovered, “during the first years of Chávez’s presidency, oil prices hovered at less than 
USD$8 a barrel, the lowest price in decades” (Tinker Salas 2015: 149). To remedy this situation 
the Venezuelan government sought to reclaim its role with the OPEC and its oversight over 
                                                          
14 In 1974 “the total flow of resources originating in OPEC and available for non-oil developing countries was about 




PDVSA. Hence, “Venezuela assumed the leadership position of OPEC between 2001 and 2002 
and hosted its summit meeting in Caracas.” Chávez’s visits to nations member of OPEC created 
concerns that he was getting involved with terrorists, yet other critics just pointed out that his main 
concern was to raise the oil prices (Tinker Salas 2015: 149). Chávez’s administration also sought 
to remedy the loopholes of the nationalization of the oil industries started by Pérez in the 1970s. 
Making use of his special powers granted by the National Legislature, in 2001 Chávez’s 
government approved a new “Hydrocarbon Law that placed oil unequivocally under state control” 
(Tinker Salas 2015: 149). According to PDVESA official page the 2001 Hydrocarbon Law 
approved by the Decree Number 1.510 “configured a new judicial framework that reversed the 
process of gradual privatization exposed during the 1990s decade and allowed to recover the 
control of the country’s energy resources for the benefit of the Venezuelan people15”. In the content 
of the 2001 Hydrocarbon Law is stated that this Law recognizes the principle of property of the 
Republic over the hydrocarbon sites, which means that the “State can directly exploit the resources, 
regulate their exploitation and when the referred activities are executed by others different from 
the State, the State has the right to benefit or participate from the resource exploitation. Is not about 
a bare title of property, but a complete property hold16”. With this Law the government made sure 
that the oil sites and its exploitation would remain within the hands of the state. As can be noted 
in figure 1, during the first six years of the Chávez’s administration the state counted with 
increasing oil prices and public oil exports, especially in 2005.  
 
                                                          
15 Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA). 2005. “Nuevas Leyes” [New Laws]. http://www.pdvsa.com/ (March 10, 
2016).  
16 Gaceta Oficial de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela. 2001. Decreto con Fuerza de Ley Orgánica de 





Figure 1. Relation of Venezuelan Public Oil Exports and OPEC Average Oil Prices 
 
Source: Venezuelan Central Bank and BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2015.   
 
Through the country’s active role in the OPEC and the complete nationalization of the oil 
industry, the Venezuelan state had a material basis, the oil wealth, to allocate resources abroad, 
among other uses. Even though the country tended to allocate bilateral loans and grants in an 
informal matter (Coronel 2006), Venezuela has been characterized by the participation in the 
following four agreements and the creation of its own international platforms to allocate its loans: 
The San José Agreement (1980); Energy Cooperation Agreement of Caracas (2000); Alliance for 
the People of Our America-Commerce Treaty of the Nations (ALBA-TCP) (2004); and Petro 
Caribe (2005).   
III.B-1 The San José Agreement (1980) 
 In the great Caribbean only Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia and Trinidad & Tobago are 
energy exporters (Arriaga Rodriguez 2003: 346). However, Mexico and Venezuela concentrate 
over the 80% of oil exports of the Latin American and Caribbean region (Ruiz-Caro 2006: 14). 
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Through the Latin American Energy Organization17 (OLADE), Venezuela assumed an energy 
cooperation program to supply oil to Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras and Panama. This 
cooperation program was signed in 1974 and consisted in financing part of the oil bill of these 
countries for a period of two years (Arriaga Rodriguez 2003: 347). As consequence of this 
program, in August of 1980 Venezuela and Mexico signed the energy cooperation agreement 
“Programa de Cooperacion Energetica para los Paises de Centro America y el Caribe” [Program 
of Energy Cooperation for Central America and the Caribbean] also called the San José 
Agreement. This agreement emerged during an annual meeting of OLADE’s energy ministers in 
1979 in which Venezuela invited Mexico to participate in this energy cooperation agreement. The 
treaty recognizes “two categories donors (Venezuela and Mexico) and beneficiaries (Guatemala, 
El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Barbados, Jamaica and Dominican Republic);” 
Belize and Haiti signed the agreement later on18. 
Through this energy cooperation program, Venezuela and Mexico ensured to the 
beneficiary countries to supply up to 160,000 barrels of oil per day divided between 80,000 barrels 
Mexico and 80,000 barrels Venezuela19. The financial aid mechanism of this agreement is that the 
supplier countries offer a “credit up to 20% of the oil bill amount, with an annual interest rate of 
2% and a period of 20 years to make the payments, when the credit is used to finance energy 
                                                          
17 OLADE is an intergovernmental organization constituted in 1973 through the subscription of the Convenio de 
Lima. Its purpose is to promote “integration, protection, conservation, rational advantage, commercialization and to 
defense the energy resources of the region.” Its member’s countries are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, Barbados, Cuba, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Dominican 
Republic, Suriname, Trinidad & Tobago, México, Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, Panamá and Argelia (OLADE Official Web Page 2016).  
18 Alvarez Loera, Graciela. “El petroleo diplomatico en Centroamerica” [Diplomatic Oil in Central America]. 
http://www.azc.uam.mx/publicaciones/alegatos/pdfs/1/1-14.pdf (April 14, 2016).   
19 Efemerides Venezolanas. 2000. “Acuerdo de Cooperacion Energetica de Caracas” [Carcas Energy Cooperation 





projects in order to promote the rationalizing of oil consumption20.” The agreement recognizes that 
the commercial signed contracts are going to be separate for each country, which means that the 
contracts ensure control from the supplier countries to adapt the conditions differently for each 
recipient21.  
The legal characteristics of the agreement state that it is valid for a year and that is has to 
be renewed annually. In 2005 the San José treaty was renewed by Chávez and by the Mexican 
president Vicente Fox. Both countries were providing 160.000 oil barrels per day (80.000 each 
country) under prices cheaper than the market22. This agreement states that the generation of a 
credit line is equivalent to a 25% of the delivered oil to the participating countries if the oil prices 
are above USD$27 per barrel. This financing can be used on the execution of infrastructure 
projects, transportation, environment and energy, but always with the objective to promote 
commercial exchange between Venezuela and Mexico. Because this agreement was in conjunction 
with Mexico it did not represent that much loss for Venezuela, especially since the financing of 
the oil prices would not happen if the unit of barrel of oil was below USD$2723.   
III.B-2 Energy Cooperation Agreement of Caracas (2000)  
In October 28th of 2000, the government of Venezuela promoted the establishment of the 
“Energy Cooperation Agreement of Caracas” (Acuerdo de Cooperación Energética de Caracas) 
which benefited ten Caribbean states: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Panama, 
                                                          
20 See Alvarez Loera.   
21 See Alvarez Loera. 
22 2005. “Venezuela y Mexico Prorrogan el Acuerdo de San Jose de cooperacion energetica” [Venezuela and 
Mexico Extend the Energy Cooperation San Jose Agreement],  America Economica, 
http://www.americaeconomica.com/numeros4/328/noticias/agchavesfoxju.htm (Accessed April 10, 2016).   
23 2007. “Venezuela y Mexico renovaran acuerdo energetico” [Venezuela and Mexico renew energy agreement], El 
Universal, http://www.eluniversal.com/2007/08/13/eco_apo_renovaran-acuerdo-de_405126 (Accessed March 12, 





Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Belize. Cuba did not sign in the first 
convention, but signed a particular agreement later that same year. In the terms of the Agreement 
of Caracas is stated that it will work in parallel to the San José Pact and instead of nullifying the 
agreement of 1980, this one was meant to expand the number of beneficiary countries, the amount 
of allocated oil and the financial terms24. Yet, the main difference between the Caracas Agreement 
and the San José Pact is that Venezuela was the only supplier and Mexico was out of the treaty. 
Regarding this agreement, Chávez is quoted asserting that the San José treaty became “too rigid” 
and Mexico’s reluctance to include other countries in the program (especially Cuba) was among 
his motivations to create this new agreement25. Through this new initiative, Venezuela 
“contributed 80.000 extra barrels of oil daily with a financing of up to 15 years, with a grace period 
of one year, and an interest rate of 2% for the portion of the financed bill” (Serbin 2006: 86). In 
order to justify that this agreement would not be counterproductive to Venezuela, the minister of 
international affairs, Jorge Valero, stated that “we are not giving away 80.000 barrels of oil26. We 
are selling barrels of oil, the difference is that the payment formulas are more tolerable, they are 
more concessional. For instance, the interest rates are lower than the LIBOR rate [London 
Interbank Offered Rate], which means that….they would have a less disturbing effect over the 
borrower’s financial structures27”. 
 
 
                                                          
24 See Efemerides Venezolanas 2000.  
25 See Efemerides Venezolanas 2000.  
26 By 2000, the average oil price was $27.6 per barrel. Under this price, the 80.000 barrels would have a cost of 
$2.208 million daily, and an annual average cost of $805,920 million.  




Table 6. Energy Cooperation Agreement of Caracas Committed Amounts of Oil by 
Country 
Country Barrels per Day 
Cuba 98,00028 
Dominican Republic 20,000 
Guatemala 10,000 
Costa Rica 8,000 
Panama 8,000 







Source: Efemerides de Venezuela 2000; Serbin 2006: 85.    
 The relation between Cuba and Venezuela was ‘especial’ in comparison with the relation 
of Venezuela with other countries of the region, especially after the arrival of Chávez to the 
presidency (Serbin 2006; Romero 2010). During the renovation of the San José Pact in August of 
1999, Venezuela expressed its desire to include Cuba and other countries in the agreement, 
however, the renovation signed by Chávez and Ernesto Zedillo did not incorporate the changes 
proposed by Venezuela29. As noted before, in 2000 Venezuela designed another energy program, 
without Mexico, which included a total of 10 countries. However, a few days later, in October 30th 
of the same year, Chávez and the president of Cuba Fidel Castro signed the Convenio Integral de 
Cooperación entre Venezuela y Cuba (Integral Cooperation Convent between Venezuela and 
Cuba) “which even though was based on the Caracas Agreement, it included two additional 
important elements: a period of time of five years and the inclusion of barter of goods and services 
                                                          
28 The initial amount agreed to allocate was 90.000 barrels daily (b/d), however, later on it increased to 98.000 d/d 
(Serbin 2006: 85).  
29 Cordova Luis, “Petroleo: Venezuela quiere a Cuba en Pacto de San Jose” [Oil: Venezuela Wants Cuba in the San 
Jose Pact], Inter Press Service Agencia de Noticias, http://www.ipsnoticias.net/1999/08/petroleo-venezuela-quiere-





as a mechanism of payment for the supply of oil, keeping the same conditions of the October 
agreement. The initial supply to Cuba was of 53.000 barrels daily. Later on this agreement was 
amplified: at the date of the article Cuba was receiving between 90.000 and 98.000 barrels daily 
which cover from 50% to 54% of the oil needs of the island (Serbin 2006: 85). The maximum 
fixed price since 2005 is of USD$27 per barrel, which means less than half of the international oil 
price, which was of USD$68 on April of 2006. This implied a subsidy of prices of a thousand 
million in 2005” (Serbin 2006: 86). Since 2002, the barrels of oil sold to Cuba are paid in the 
following way: “the half in 90 days after purchase and the rest over 25 years, with a 2-year grace 
period, including the cost of transportation and insurance….In exchange, Cuba sent more than 
13,000 Cuban workers to Venezuela, mostly workers in the health (doctors, nurses and 
paramedics) and sports sectors – first as a sort of barter, and then since 2003, in payments for 
professional services that reached roughly US$4.4 billion in 2007 (Romero 2010: 108). According 
to Carlos A. Romero, the energy cooperation agreements between Venezuela and Cuba 
incremented the trade relations between the two countries. Cuban-Venezuelan relations grew from 
US$388.2 million in 1998 to US$464 million in 1999, US$12 million in 2000, US$2.5 billion in 
2005, US$3.2 billion in 2006 and to US$7.1 billion in 2007, “close to 45% of the island’s total 
trade of goods and services” (Romero 2010: 109).  
 III.B-3 Alliance for the Peoples of Our America-Commerce Treaty of the Nations (ALBA-
TCP) (2004) 
A crucial agreement designed and implemented by Chávez’s administration is the 
Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America-Commerce Treaty of the Nations (ALBA-
TCP); this agreement was the umbrella for the creation of other international platforms for the 




Summit of the Americas celebrated on April of 2001, Chávez signed a declaration stating his 
opposition to the proposition of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA): “We note that the 
FTAA is the most fine expression of the appetite of domination over the region, and if it is 
implemented, would constitute a reinforcement of neoliberalism and it would create levels of 
dependence and subordination without precedence30”. That same year, during the Third Summit 
of State Presidents and the Government of the Association of the Caribbean States, the president 
of Venezuela presents the idea of the ALBA as “a proposal of economic, social, political and 
cultural integration of the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean31.” This proposal was 
formally institutionalized in December of 2004 when Chávez and Fidel Castro met in La Habana 
and signed the protocols of the agreement. To the ALBA-TCP later on adhered Bolivia (2006), 
Nicaragua (2007), Dominica (2008), Honduras32 (2008), Ecuador (2009), Antigua &Barbuda 
(2009), St. Vicent and Granadines (2009) and St. Kitts and Nevis (Date not available); Saint Lucia 
and Haiti are invited members since 201233.  
Beside designing ALBA-TCP as a regional integration agreement that is opposed to 
neoliberalism and which is based on solidarity and cooperation, what tangible alternatives it offers 
to its members? Between the first two members, Cuba and Venezuela, the main measures 
implemented were: both Cuba and Venezuela approved to eliminate any kind of tariff to the 
imports that came from either country; also it was tax-exempt any investment that came from one 
of the two countries (both from the state and private), during the period of the recovery of the 
                                                          
30 ALBA-TCP. 2013. “ALBA-TCP Construyendo un mundo pluripolar” [ALBA-TCP Building a Pluripolar World] 
http://alba-tcp.org/public/documents/pdf/CumbresALBADic2004Dic2013.pdf (April 14, 2016).  
31 See ALBA-TCP 2013.  
32 In December of 2009 the facto president of Honduras, Roberto Micheletti issued a decree through which he 
decided Honduras should leave ALBA, which was ratified in 2010 (ALBA-TCP Official Web Page 2010: “History 
of ALBA-TCP”).  




investment; the oil exported from Venezuela to Cuba would be based in the prices of the 
international market, however, “since the oil prices are extremely changeable, Cuba offers to buy 
Venezuelan oil on a guaranteed price not inferior to USD$27 per barrel, always in conformity with 
the compromises assumed by Venezuela as one of the OPEC countries34”. In 2005, Venezuela 
inaugurated a branch of the Venezuelan oil company Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) in La 
Habana, named PDVSA-Cuba; the same year it was inaugurated a filial of the Industrial Bank of 
Venezuela in Habana as well. With the adherence of Bolivia to the agreement, Venezuela stated 
that would donate up to US$100 million to finance infrastructure projects in Bolivia as well as to 
increment the import of Bolivarian products35. According to the “ALBA-TCP, Creating a 
Multipolar World Report” (2013), besides the promotion of trade of goods, the ALBA promotes 
the exchange of medical doctors, teachers and even cultural interchange among the participating 
countries. By 2011 more than 3 million people participated in the ALBA literacy programs and 
more than 1,730 young medicine students from 70 countries were totally funded grant-holders36. 
In 2009, the intra-ALBA commerce ascended to USD$4.352 million of which the two main 
commodities were oil and minerals (24%) and food products (24%)37.  
Throughout the years, ALBA-TCP took the form of diverse projects that included 
environmental issues, cultural exchange and preservation, education, health, telecommunication, 
tourism and health38. In the economic sphere of the ALBA agreement was created the ALBA Bank 
as a financing alternative for the member states. The ALBA Bank (BALBA) was created in 2008 
                                                          
34 See ALBA-TCP 2013.  
35 See ALBA-TCP 2013.  
36 ALBA-TCP. 2011. “ALBA-TCP Pamphlet-March 11.” http://alba-tcp.org/en/contenido/alba-tcp-bulletins (April 
15, 2016).   
37 ALBA-TCP. 2013. “Comercio Intra ALBA-TCP” [ALBA-TCP Intra commerce], 
http://albatcp.org/public/images/Estadistica/Comerciointra.jpg (April 15, 2016).  




with headquarters in Caracas; at that moment the member countries of the bloc were Venezuela, 
Cuba, Bolivia and Nicaragua. According to the description of its protocol, its objective is to finance 
development projects and programs by promoting a fair economic exchange and egalitarian to all 
the members of the ALBA39. By 2016, the country members of the BALBA are Venezuela, Cuba, 
Bolivia, Nicaragua, St. Vincent & Grenadine and the Commonwealth of Dominica. According to 
the Constitutive Agreement of BALBA (2008), if other Latin American countries want to be part 
of this institution they “shall sign the Agreement of the Bolivarian Alternative for the Peoples of 
Our America (ALBA)”40. In the Constitutive Agreement is established the operations that BALBA 
may perform: give credits, credit facilities, bonds, collateral and other guarantees; issue, place, 
structure and administer all kinds of securities; act as commission agent and depository of funds 
security. In the same document is also stated that BALBA is divided into three classes of ordinary 
share: Class A shares correspond to the Latin American countries that are part of the ALBA-TCP 
agreement; Class B shares are regional nation states, whether they are or not members of ALBA, 
as well as states outside the region; and Class C shares are central banks, financial and non-
financial, state, mixed or semi-state entities, being understood that such entities in which the State 
has a shareholding greater than 50%41. In 2008, the BALBA initiated with a contribution of the 
ALBA’s country members which ascended to a capital of US$1 billion (Hart Landsberg 2009: 8). 
In the same year, Chávez described the “ALBA Bank as a financing instrument that is different 
from other financing institutions because it does not impose strict conditionality for the given loans 
and it functions based in a consensus of all its members”42. During ALBA’s eleventh summit in 
                                                          
39 See ALBA-TCP 2013.  
40 ALBA Bank. 2008. “Constitutive Agreement.” Legal Documents, http://www.bancodelalba.org/marco-legal/ 
(April 15, 2016). 
41 See ALBA Bank 2008.  




2012, the member countries of that moment (Cuba, Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Dominica, 
Antigua and Barbuda and St. Vincent and the Grenadines) agreed to contribute  one percent of 
their international reserves into the bank to fund development projects43. 
The main function of the BALBA is to finance the different projects implemented by the 
ALBA bloc. For instance, in 2009 BALBA announced that it will finance new projects in the areas 
of health, culture and energy in Nicaragua, Bolivia, Cuba, Venezuela, Honduras and Dominica 
with a cost of USD$17.900 million. In the article is quoted Esteban Martel, the executive director 
of BALBA in Cuba, who asserts that BALBA differs with the other lending international 
organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF, which “have never allocated funds to 
alphabetize and to improve the health of the people in the region”44. However, there is not clear 
official statistics that show the activities of BALBA.  
ALBA-TCP differs from the previous regional agreements in its complexity and scope of 
actions. Even though the energy agreements of San José and the Acuerdo de Caracas had a 
component of financing for development, their main function was to sell oil under preferential 
conditions to the states of Central America and the Caribbean. In contrast, ALBA-TCP extends as 
an ‘integral’ cooperation bloc where the participating nations could exchange goods, services, 
human capital and knowledge. Moreover, according to several authors, ALBA is more than a 
regional agreement, rather it was also the intent to shift the international balance of power. In the 
article “ALBA as Instrument of Soft-Balancing,” Alfredo Toro (2011) argues that ALBA is a soft-
                                                          
43 Rueda, Jorge. 2012. “ALBA Countries to Pool Funds in Joint Bank,” CNS News, 
http://cnsnews.com/news/article/alba-countries-pool-funds-joint-bank (accessed April 10, 2016).  
44 2009. “Banco del ALBA financia nuevos proyectos sociales y economicos” [ALBA Bank Finance new Social and 
Economic Projects], Cuba Debate, http://www.cubadebate.cu/noticias/2009/04/30/banco-del-alba-financia-





balancing instrument meant to delay, frustrate and weaken the dominant presence of the United 
States in Latin American and the Caribbean. Under this vision of regional integration and self-
determination, Toro asserts that ALBA tries to become an alternative to the American hegemony 
by two distinct forms: first, instead of having a neoliberal approach, its intention is to strengthen 
the state and not the market; and second, in contrast to other international lending organizations, 
ALBA and the ALBA Bank does not impose conditionality on its borrowers and recipients. Thus, 
ALBA becomes an alternative within the mainstream international trade market. However, that 
open counter-hegemonic stand is what makes ALBA less appealing to the region than other 
agreements, according to Altman Borbón. An important observation made by Altman Borbón is 
that “while this agreement was based on the policy of trade, not aid, ALBA is anchored more on 
the idea of a barter system rather than free trade” (Altamann Borbón 2015:4). This means that the 
responsibility that comes along with exports, debts and loans is not that predominant in this 
agreement which is more concentrated on the exchange of their comparative advantage resources 
which is highly clear with Venezuela allocating oil and its derivatives and Cuba exporting medical 
doctors.  
III.B-4 Petro Caribe (2005) 
In 2005 the new energy cooperation agreement, Petro Caribe, is created by Venezuela 
which differs from the ALBA but is constituted within its framework. According to Petro Caribe 
official page, “the existence of Petro Caribe (or Petro America or Petro Sur) cannot be understood, 
if the importance of ALBA is not first recognized45”. In Petro Caribe web page is also explained 
that Petro Caribe is part of the change of direction of Venezuela’s foreign policy which is framed 
                                                          
45 Petro Caribe. 2009. “Acerca de Petro Caribe” [About Petro Caribe]. http://www.petrocaribe.org/ (March 13, 




in the integrationist impetus proposed by ALBA. However, there are two main differences between 
Petro Caribe and ALBA. First, Petro Caribe’s main function is to sell oil under concessional terms 
to the nations that are part of the agreement, whereas ALBA is a more integral trade scheme that 
encompasses the exchange of all kinds of goods and services. Second, in contrast to ALBA where 
all the participating countries act as donors and recipients and as lenders and borrowers, the Petro 
Caribe agreement positions Venezuela as the lender (supplier) and the participating countries as 
the borrowers (receivers). Through Petro Caribe the Venezuelan government finances oil to 
Caribbean and Central American countries under preferential prices. According to Andres Serbin, 
Petro Caribe deepened the conditions of the 2000 Caracas Agreement, being the Petro Caribe 
conditions more generous than the previous one: the participating countries have 15 years to make 
the payments, two years of grace to make the first payment and an annual interest rate of 2%. 
(Serbin 2006: 87). In the Petro Caribe official web page is stated that in the period of 2005-2009, 
“the accumulated oil and other products reached a total of 90.5 million barrels. The financed 
portion of the oil receipt (USD$3.000 million) represent for the recipient countries a saving of 
USD$1.4 billion. These resources are invested in social and development projects within the 
participating countries46”. 
There are 18 signatory countries47, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Belize, Cuba, 
Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Dominican Republic, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines (signed in 2005); Haiti and Nicaragua (adhered in 2007); in 2008 signed Honduras, 
in 2012 Guatemala and in 2014 El Salvador48. Just as the ALBA agreement was justified as an 
alternative to the asymmetries of globalization, and more specifically to the Free Area Agreement 
                                                          
46 See Petro Caribe. 2009. “Acerca de Petro Caribe.”  
47 Petro Caribe. 2009. “Cronologia” [Chronology]. http://www.petrocaribe.org/ (March 13, 2016).  
48 Even though Bahamas, Guatemala and St. Lucia signed the agreement, the countries have not applied it in practice 




between the United States and Latin America, Petro Caribe was also justified “to confront 
asymmetries in the consumption and access to energy, in a context of an energy crisis spurred by 
the price increase of hydrocarbons. This situation greatly affected non-producer countries, whose 
oil bills are a significant component of their economies, and exacerbated the poverty level of the 
population49”. The financing offered by Petro Caribe works as follow: the proposed finance scale 
is up to 50% of the oil bill, taking as reference the price of the hydrocarbons. The financing is up 
to 25 years, including two years of grace, and the interest rate is reduced to 1% if the oil price is 
above US$40 per barrel50. However, this conditions vary according to the oil prices as it is shown 
in table 7. If the international price of oil exceeds US$40 per barrel, the previous financing terms 
remains. But if the price of the oil barrel is below US$40 “the term for payment of products will 
be 17 years, with a two-year grace period and an interest rate at 2%, whereas short-term payment 
foresees a period between 30 and 90 days” (SELA 2015: 13).  
Table 7. Petro Caribe Line of Financing (Updated until 2015) 
Price per Barrel in US$ % to Finance Condition 
> 15 5  
2-year grace period 





   
>40 30  
2-year grace period 





Source: SELA 2015: 13.  
                                                          
49 Petro Caribe. 2015. “Management Report June 2015.” http://www.petrocaribe.org/ (March 10, 2016).  
50 Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA). 2005. “PDV Caribe.” 
http://www.pdvsa.com/index.php?tpl=interface.en/design/readmenu.tpl.html&newsid_ob_id=4982&newsid_temas=




By 2014, the hydrocarbons supply quota measured in thousands of barrels per day (TBD) is 
the following51: 
Table 8. Petro Caribe Supply Quota by 2014  
Country Quota 2014 (MBD) Supplies 2005-2014 (MMB) 
Dominican Republic 30.0 91.1 
Jamaica 23.5 83.5 
Nicaragua 27 64.3 
Haiti 14 32.6 
Guyana 5.2 11.5 
Antigua and Barbuda 4.4 2.9 
Grenada 1 2 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 1.2 1.8 
Dominica 1 1 
St. Vincent And The Grenadines 1 0.9 
Belize 4 2.9 
Suriname 10 3.2 
El Salvador 7 15 
Total Petro Caribe 129 313 
Source: Petro Caribe Management Report 2015: 7. 
 The Petro Caribe agreement states the necessity to create an enterprise to oversee the 
operating capacity of the agreement. As subsidiary of PDVSA, was created PDV Caribe which has 
as main functions “to support the joint planning, organization, and development of capabilities to 
transport, receive, store, distribute, and commercialize hydrocarbons through a direct, secure, and 
reliable means of supply for the Caribbean and Central American countries; to promote 
infrastructure projects which lead to the sovereign management of energy in the Caribbean and 
Central America; to foster technological cooperation, technical training, and activities related to 
the conservation of electrical energy; and to coordinate required transportation in order to fulfill 
contracts through PDV Marina and/or Transalba, shipping company that supports Petro Caribe 
operations”52. Beside PDV Caribe, the agreement also “stipulates that the existence of public 
                                                          
51 In the Petro Caribe Management Report 2015, it is not stated the supplied quota to Cuba in the period 2005-2014, 
however, according to estimations by Serbin (2006), Cuba had assigned a quota of 98.000 b/d which in nine years 
would represent a total of 32193 million of barrels.  




bodies to conduct energy operations will be required, and for this purpose, Venezuela offers the 
technical cooperation for establishing such bodies in the member countries. To date, eleven mixed 
enterprises have been undertaken between PDV Caribe and public enterprises of eleven member 
countries” (SELA 2015: 14). Through PDV Caribe, the Venezuelan state bought a share of the 
public oil enterprises of its lenders. As table 9 shows, PDV Caribe acquired almost half of the 
foreign state companies, however, in the case of Cuba it was created a PDVSA branch in La 
Habana whose 100% belongs to PDV Caribe.  
Table 9. Petro Caribe Mixed Public Enterprises 
Share Composition Of The Joint Ventures Created 
ALBA Petro Caribe (Belize 
Energy) Limited 
55% PDV Caribe, S.A. 45% Belize Petroleum And Energy 
Limited 
PDV Caribe (Dominica) LTD 55% PDV Caribe, S.A. 45% Dominica National Petroleum 
Company LTD 
PDV Grenada LTD 55% PDV Caribe, S.A. 45% Petrocaribe Grenada LTD 
Petrojam Limited 49% PDV Caribe, S.A. 51% Petroleum Corporation Of Jamaica 
ALBA De Nicaragua, Sociedad 
Anonima 
51% PDV Caribe, S.A. 49% Empresa Nicaraguense De 
Petroleo (Petronic) 
PDV St. Kitts Nevis Limited 55% PDV Caribe, S.A. 45% St. Kitts Nevis Energy Company 
Limited  
 
Pdv Saint Vincent And The 
Grenadines Ltd  
55% PDV Caribe, S.A. 45% Petro Caribé St. Vincent And The 
Grenadines (Svg) Limited  
 
Refineria Dominicana De 
Petróleo, S.A.  
49% PDV Caribe, S.A. 51% Dominican State 
Societe D´Investissement Petion 
Bolivar, S.A.  
51% PDV Caribe, S.A. 49% Haitian State 
Alba Petróleos El Salvador, 
S.E.M  
60% PDV Caribe, S.A. 40% ENEPASA  
Pdvsa Cuba, S.A.  100 % Pdv Caribe  - 
Cuvenpetrol, S.A.  49% Pdvsa Cuba, S.A.  51% Comercial Cupet, S.A.  
Transportes Del Alba Inc.  50% Pdvsa Cuba, S.A.  50% Internacional Maritima, S.A.  
Trocana World Inc.  50% Pdvsa Cuba, S.A.  50% Wagoneer International Limited  
Tovase Development Corp.  50% Pdvsa Cuba, S.A.  50% Variation Limited  
Cuvenpeq, S.A.  14% Pdvsa Cuba, S.A.  51% Grupo Empresarial De La 
Industria Química (Geiq)  
35% Pequiven, S.A.  
Pdv Suriname N.V.  50% Pdvcaribe, S.A.  50% Surfuel  




 As noted before, the relation between Cuba and Venezuela is different from the rest 
participating countries. After the establishment of the Acuerdo de Caracas in 2000, Cuba and 
Venezuela signed their particular agreement days later, moreover, Cuba counts with a branch of 
PDVSA in its territory. According to the report “Evolution of the Petro Caribe Energy Cooperation 
Agreement” prepared by SELA, “Cuba is considered a Petro Caribe de facto member because, 
although the supply and exchange with Cuba are done under the scheme of this Agreement, they 
are contractually derived from the Comprehensive Cooperation Agreement (CIC) between 
Venezuela and Cuba, signed in 2000. In fact, Cuba is the country with the highest established quota 
among all members, 98,000 barrels per day (SELA 2015: 8). Since 2005 the daily quota of oil 
exported to Cuba has grown to a total of 153,000 barrels which is the result of “98,000 barrels 
through the Integral Cooperation agreement (of bilateral character) plus 55,000 barrels through 
Petro Caribe, amounting to 90% of Cuba’s total consumption of about 170,000 barrels a day”…the 
refineries in Cuba are refurbished by PDVSA which “processes and eventually re-exports part of 
the 153,000 barrels a day Cuba receives from Venezuela” (Romero 2010: 110).  
 In the SELA report (2015) are compiled recent data about Petro Caribe’s current 
performance:  
 Of the quota of 129 thousand barrels of oil per day, Petro Caribe has met 74.4% of the 
total, up to January of 2015.  
 Since the implementation of the agreement a total of 307 million oil barrels have been 
supplied to the 13 member countries. Out of the 13 members, the major destination of the 
oil has been Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Jamaica and Haiti. These four countries have 




 “A total of 432 projects that account for USD$3,944 million in investment, have been 
implemented by PETROCARIBE since its creation until 2014” (SELA 2015: 19).  
The principal element that links Petro Caribe to ALBA is the financing of development 
projects through schemes such as the ALBA Caribe Fund (ACF), “which is constituted by 
resources coming from the savings generated by the financing of the oil bill and direct trade, as 
well as coming from financial and non-financial instruments53”. The Fund was opened with a 
Venezuelan investment of USD$50 million and that amount grew to USD$112 million, which 
have financed projects in 10 countries of the region: Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Cuba, 
Dominica, Granada, Guyana, Haiti, San Vincent, Saint Cristobal and Nieves, Grenadines and 
Nicaragua54. According to Petro Caribe official web page, the ACF is used for programs and 
projects that prioritize issues of health, education, housing, and the economic development of small 
and medium industries. In the same section is stated that by 2009 “it had been allocated USD$179 
million to 85 projects in 11 countries in the region and USD$29 million to 3 electricity projects55”. 
During the IX Summit of Heads of State and Government of Petro Caribe, named “Special 
Summit”, held in Caracas, on March of 2015, the Summit ratified its compromise to “support the 
expansion of the ALBA Caribbean Fund in additional two hundred million dollars, to lever up the 
socio productive development in the Caribbean countries, as well as to finance the advancing of 
complementary energy” (SELA 2015: 11).  
Another initiative within Petro Caribe and linked to ALBA-TCP is the Complementary 
Economic Zone (PEZ) which covers the 21 countries that are part of both Petro Caribe and ALBA: 
                                                          
53 Petro Caribe. 2009. “ALBA Caribbean Fund.” 
http://www.petrocaribe.org/index.php?tpl=interface.en/design/union/readmenu_acerca2.tpl.html&newsid_obj_id=40
5&newsid_temas=4 (April 15, 2016).  
54 See Petro Caribe. 2009. “ALBA Caribbean Fund.” 




“in May, 2013, at the Ninth Ministerial Council of Petro Caribe, the creation of an Ad Hoc Group 
was agreed to define the technical and legal foundations to make viable the creation of a Petro 
Caribe Economic Zone (PEZ), in order to increase and diversify intra-regional trade, strengthen 
production sectors, promote social investment, and foster development56”. The permanent 
committee is integrated by St. Vincent & Grenadines, Venezuela, Dominican Republic, Nicaragua 
and Haiti. In the first meeting of the Ad Hoc Group it was created a permanent coordination 
committee that would work in the five areas of transport and communication, tourism, production 
networking, trade and integration, social and cultural. According to the Petro Caribe Management 
Report 2015, each will tackle the following issues: 
Table 10. Petro Caribe Economic Zone (PEZ) Areas of Investment 
Area Issue 
Social and Cultural 
Structuring Programs 
Universalization of education; universalization of health; food Security and 
Sovereignty; promotion of Social Participation; cultural Identity.  
Transportation and 
Communications 
Legal assessment of existing integration mechanisms, and exchange of necessary 
information; identification of concrete projects: evaluation of civil aviation alliances in 
the Eastern Caribbean, as a pilot project that enables the establishment of cargo and 
passenger routes. 
Productive Networking Legal and tariff assessment of the existing integration mechanisms, and exchange of 
necessary information; Include Technical Assistance and Cooperation Programs; 
Coordination between the universities of the region, not only from the academic point 
of view; Identify alternative forms of production 
Program for Tourism Legal assessment of the existing integration mechanisms and exchange of necessary 
information; Carry out a diagnosis of the main difficulties that the Member States face 
to develop tourism; Identify tourism related projects that encourage an increase in the 
flow of tourists from the region.  
Program for Trade and 
Integration 
Legal assessment of the existing integration mechanisms and exchange of necessary 
information; Exchange of trade statistics.  
Assessment of existing tariffs structures in the region; Make an inventory of existing 
potentials; Continue fostering and deepening the Petro Caribe Fair Trade Mechanism.  
Establish a list of priority goods and services that may; be subject to trade 
compensations for payment of their long-term oil bill;  
Establish an automatic quota allocation mechanism by country, of products of origin, 
to be compensated against the long term oil bill. 
Source: Petro Caribe Management Report 2015.  
                                                          




The use of oil in Venezuelan foreign policy started to take form in the 1970s, during the 
oil boom. Being a major oil producer and oil exporter, the Venezuelan state counted with revenues 
to allocate resources abroad and to assume a leadership role in international affairs. During 1974-
76, Venezuela allocated loans abroad through the cash-loan plan that benefited Central American 
and Caribbean countries with low interest rates, extended repayment periods and lower-oil prices 
than the market. Yet, at this point is not established a formal scheme with compromised fixed 
quotas, element that was later included in the San José Agreement and in Petro Caribe. Yet, with 
the San José treaty, Venezuela was not completely empowered to assume a counter-hegemonic 
position because the agreement just contemplated to sell oil under concessional prices, moreover, 
the supplier role was shared with Mexico and as noted before when Chávez tried to enforce 
changes within the agreement (such as including Cuba among the recipients), they were not 
acknowledged by Mexico. However, the subsequent energy agreements reflect the evolution of 
Venezuela as lender and how the country reinforced the petro diplomacy by assuming more 
counter-hegemonic practices. With the implementation of the Acuerdo de Caracas and the bilateral 
oil agreement with Cuba, Venezuela took the lead in allocating more barrels of oil and extending 
more concessions to its borrowers. However, ALBA and Petro Caribe were the maximum counter-
hegemonic intents because these agreements openly declared to be opposed to the current 
international order; they professed to be an alternative for the countries of Central America and 
the Caribbean through their facilities of payment and free conditionality. The alternative function 
was especially relevant for Cuba which had been under the United States embargo57 for years but 
with ALBA and Petro Caribe it found a space for international exchange.   
                                                          
57 After the triumph of the Cuban Revolution in 1959, the new Cuban president Fidel Castro shifted the country in a 
Communist path which included a close relation with Soviet Union, nationalized US-owned properties and increased 




III.C- Type of Loans Allocated by Venezuela 
Since the framework of action and justification for the agreements created by Venezuela is 
cooperation, regional integration and to some degree social justice, the country emphasizes that its 
loans and programs are under concessional (or soft) terms in order to become a real alternative for 
the countries of the region. As the analysis of the previous agreements demonstrate, Venezuela 
sold oil under concessional terms. In table 11 is shown that Petro Caribe is the agreement with the 
most participating countries, however, the loans terms are not that different from the other energy 
agreements.   
Table 11. Oil Agreements between Venezuela and Central America and the Caribbean 
Agreement Conditions Participating Countries Allocated loans 
San José Treaty 
(1980) 
 
To sell oil under stable prices and 
favorable conditions. A credit 
line equivalent to a 25% of the 
delivered oil to the participating 
countries if the oil prices are 
above $27 dollars per barrel. 
Barbados, Belize, Costa Rico, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, 
Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama and 
Dominican Republic 
Both countries were providing 
160.000 oil barrels per day 
(80.000 each country) under 
prices cheaper than the market. 
The 80.000 daily barrels of oil 
represent an average of 29,200 






Contribute 80.000 extra barrels 
of oil daily; financing of up to 15 
years; grace period of one year; 
interest rate of 2% for the portion 
of the financed bill. 
Costa Rica, El Salvador, Haiti, 
Honduras, Panama, Dominican 
Republic, Jamaica, Guatemala, 
Nicaragua and Belize 
Allocation of 75,100 per day to 
10 participating countries. The 
average per year is of 27,411,500 





Sell oil at the fixed price of US27 
per barrel; oil is paid, the half in 
90 days after purchase and the 
rest over 25 years; 2 years-grace 
period. 
Cuba Initial supply of 53.000 barrels 
daily. Then, extended to 90.000-
98.000 barrels daily. Supplying 
98.000 barrels daily that 
represents 35,770 MMB per year.  
Petro Caribe 
(2005) 
15 years to make the payments; 
two years of grace to make the 
first payment and an annual 
interest rate of 2%. 
Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Belize, 
Cuba, Dominica, El Salvador, Grenada, 
Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, 
Jamaica, Nicaragua, the Dominican 
Republic, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines and 
Suriname 
313 MMB were supplied during 
the period 2005-2014. 
 
Source: Own elaboration from Romero 2010; Petro Caribe Management Report 2015.   
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Danielle. 2016. “U.S.-Cuba Relations,” Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-





Beginning with the San José Agreement in 1980, Venezuela committed to allocate up to 
80 thousand barrels of oil daily under the market prices and offered a credit line if the oil price per 
barrel exceeded USD$27, however, as figure 2 shows, even though by 1980 the average OPEC oil 
prices was of USD$36.83 per barrel, at the end of the decade it decreased to USD$18.2358, trend 
that continued during the 1990s59. This means that since the oil prices declined from USD$27.56 
in 1985 to USD$17.97 in 1999, the credit line of the San José Agreement was not applicable.  
Figure 2. Crude Oil Prices 1980-1999 US Dollar per Barrel  
 
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2015. 
 
In the subsequent agreements, the conditions of the loans for the borrowers improved 
because Venezuela increased the amount of allocated oil (from 80.000 barrels daily in 1980 to 
124.8 thousand daily barrels in 2005 under Petro Caribe), yet, the financing payment time 
remained of 15 years (with the exception of Cuba that has a 25 years period to make its payments) 
                                                          
58 These prices are of money of the day. At 2014 US dollars the value would be US$105.81 and US$34.80 per barrel 
respectively (BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2015).  










1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000




and the interest rate of 2%. However, the form of payment varied since 2000 with the Convenio 
Integral de Cooperación [Covenant of Integral Cooperation] when barter was introduced as a form 
of payment. Cuba (the only borrower of this agreement) could pay back with goods and services 
which Cuba did mainly by exporting its human capital. In 2000, there was the first flight that took 
Venezuelan patients to receive medical attention in Cuba; however, it was in 2003 when the social 
cooperation program started with 53-member Cuban health workers who became part of the social 
program “Barrio Adentro60”. After the 2000 Convenio, Cuba sent to Venezuela more than 13,000 
workers who were “mostly workers in health (doctors, nurses and paramedics) and workers from 
the sport sector” (Romero 2010: 108). By 2007, Cuban authorities stated that “there were 39,000 
‘collaborators’ in Venezuela, 31,000 of which were health workers. This was about 75% of all 
international Cuban aid workers, a total of 52,000 for that year” (Romero 2010: 110).  
The mechanism of barter continued under the Petro Caribe agreement, though, it was not 
open to all the signing countries. According to the Petro Caribe Management 2015 Report, “the 
agreement contemplates the possibility that signatory countries pay back part of the financed 
portion with goods and services. In this sense, an Operations Manual of the Petro Caribe 
Compensation Mechanism was prepared, approved by signatory countries at the Fifth Meeting of 
the Ministerial Council of Petro Caribe on June 11th 2009, in resolution 05.09-06, which is being 
implemented to date (2016) by six countries: El Salvador, Guyana, Nicaragua, Jamaica, the 
Dominican Republic, and Suriname61. In the Report is stated that by the end of May 2015, these 
                                                          
60 This is a social program implemented by the administration of Chavez in 2003 with the purpose to provide free 
medical attention in the neighborhoods of scarce resources of Venezuela. This program was based on a bilateral 
cooperation between Cuba and Venezuela in which Cuba would provide medical doctors to Venezuela, and 
Venezuela would pay back with the supply of oil (2015. “Barrio adentro suma más de 704 millones de consultas 
médicas gratuitas en Venezuela” [Barrio adentro has Performed more tan 704 Million of Free Medical 
Consultations], TeleSur, http://www.telesurtv.net/telesuragenda/12-anos-de-Barrio-Adentro-20150415-0079.html 
(Accessed April 15, 2016).   




six countries have compensated through goods a total of US$3,471 million as payment of the oil 
bill. In the period 2005-2014 these six countries were supplied with 174, 750 MMB of oil. As 
noted in figure 3, Nicaragua is the country that has made the most payments, whereas Dominican 
Republic (which is the country that has received most barrels of oil after Cuba) is the one with 
least payments through the barter mechanism62. 
Figure 3. Summary of Oil Bill Compensations by Country (2008-2015)  
 
Source: Petro Caribe Management Report 2015: 20. 
 
Countries such as Guyana, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic have continued to 
supply food products towards Venezuelan enterprises, such as Agropatria, Corporación 
Venezolana de Alimentos (CVAL), Corporación de Abastecimiento de Servicios Agrícolas 
(CASA) and Petroquímica de Venezuela (Pequiven)” (SELA 2015: 22). El Salvador, on the other 
hand, compensate with health services and Jamaica through the offering of English courses; 
however, food is the main received item which represents 95.92% of trade compensation, whereas 
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the “remainder is distributed between livestock (3.39%), medications (0.17%) and Clinker 
(0.17%)63”.  
Thus, the type of loans allocated by Venezuela are distinguished not only by the facilities 
that they offer to its borrowers such as line of credits according to the oil prices, grace periods and 
low-interest rates, but also by the use of barter for the payment of the debts. Through this 
mechanism the countries that are members of Petro Caribe export goods, services and human 
capital to Venezuela incrementing their commercial and cultural relations, something mainly 
envisioned, however, in the ALBA scheme.   
III-D Manifestation of Hierarchical Relations between Venezuela and its Borrowers 
 
 With the creation of regional agreements in order to sell oil under concessional loans, 
Venezuela has acquired allies and enemies in the international community which has being 
reflected in the country’s performance in international organizations and through its hierarchical 
relations. Members of the ALBA and Petro Caribe agreement have demonstrated their support to 
the Venezuelan government in international forums, yet, this was not always the case.  
 Chávez’s radicalism in action and speech was among his most remembered characteristics. 
However, Chávez would make diplomatic use of its commercial partners to smoothen the 
situations, being one of his preferred agents the Dominican president Leonel Fernández. As noted 
above, after Cuba, Dominican Republic is the country that most barrels of oil received among the 
Petro Caribe members with a total of 91.1 MMB during 2005-2014, which accounted a value of 
                                                          




USD$8,224 million; besides the Dominican government was among the biggest debtors to 
Caracas, debt that was arranged to be paid with over a 50% discount in 201564.  
The first agency of Fernández began in 2005 by mediating in a Mexico-Venezuela tense 
event. Since 1980 Venezuela and Mexico shared the position of oil suppliers to the Caribbean and 
Central American nations through the San José Agreement, however, in 2005 Chávez had an 
episode with the then president of Mexico Vicente Fox. Fox criticized Chávez for his position 
against the Free Trade Area of the Americas, Chávez responded in what Fox considered insults. 
By 2005 the relations between Venezuela and Mexico were weaken to the point that both 
presidents withdrew their respective ambassador and Fox threatened to break the diplomatic 
relations65. However, during a Petro Caribe meeting held at Caracas, Chávez gave a sign of 
wanting to leave behind the 2005 episode, by sending his regards to the then president of Mexico, 
Felipe Calderón. To do this, Chávez used as messenger Fernández, who after his intervention in 
the meeting left to travel to Mexico where he would meet with Calderón66.  
This was not the only time that Chávez asked Fernández for a diplomatic intervention. 
Venezuela under Chávez had a very conflictual relation with its neighbor Colombia, which worsen 
in 2008 when a high leader of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) was killed 
by the Colombian army in Ecuadorian territory. Due to this event Chávez made strong declarations 
                                                          
64 Delgado, Antonio Maria. 2014. “Venezuela vende con descuento parte de su deuda petrolera a  Goldman Sachs” 
[Venezuela Sells with Discount Part of its Oil Debt to Goldman Sachs], el Nuevo Gerald, 
http://www.elnuevoherald.com/noticias/mundo/america-latina/venezuela-es/article4232939.html (Accessed April 
15, 2016).  
65 2013. “Los desencuentros de Hugo Chavez with Mexico” [The Desagreements of Hugo Chavez with Mexico], 
Red Politica, http://www.redpolitica.mx/nacion/los-desencuentros-de-hugo-chavez-con-mexico (Accessed April 
15, 2016).  
66 2007. “Venezuela y Mexico restablecen acuerdo petróleo” [Venezuela and Mexico Renew Oil  Agreement], 
Protocolo, http://www.protocolo.com.mx/comercio-y-negocios/venezuela-y-mexico-restablecen-acuerdo-




against the Colombian president Alvaro Uribe which were followed by critics also made by the 
Ecuadorian president Rafael Correa against the Colombian government67. To put an end to the 
diplomatic crisis, Fernández used the annual meeting of the Rio Group held at Santo Domingo to 
make the three presidents shake hands in sign of peace, Fernández “asked his colleagues to reaffirm 
their peace disposition with a hand shake for the closure for the event68”. During an official visit 
of Chávez to the Dominican Republic in order to sign oil agreements, Chávez thanked Fernández 
for serving as mediator in the Colombia-Venezuela relation and for his “great efforts that have 
been extraordinary and will be extraordinary in seeking the harmony69”. However, Fernández’s 
mission to mediate in Venezuela’s diplomatic relations were under Chávez’s instructions. In 2010 
Chávez asked Fernández to stop the negotiations with Colombia until the substitute of president 
Uribe was elected. The petition was made by the then Minister of International Affairs, Nicolás 
Maduro who did not reveal to the news the answer of Fernández but asserted that “Venezuela 
values his decision and his efforts relating the relations between Venezuela and Colombia70”. 
The Venezuelan government not only used its alliances to mitigate diplomatic conflicts but 
also to have access to international organizations and to promote a multipolar world. According to 
Toro71 (2016), one of the elements that influence the commercial relation between Venezuela and 
                                                          
67 2008. “La Muerte del ‘numero dos’ de las FARC abre una crisis en la frontera Colombiana” [The Death of the 
‘number two’ of the FARC Causes a Crisis in the Colombian Border], el Mundo.es, 
http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2008/03/03/internacional/1204539255.html (Accessed April 15, 2016).  
68 2008. “Correa, Uribe y Chavez dan por cerrada la crisis andina con un aprenton de manos” [Correa, Uribe and 
Chavez end the Andean Crisis with a Hand Shake], el Mundo.es,  
http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2008/03/07/internacional/1204925207.html (Accessed April 15, 2016).  
69 Higueras, Martin. 2010. “Baile de elogios entre Chavez y Leonel Fernandez, mediador en la crisis Venezuela-
Colombia” [Dance of Compliments between Chavez and Fernandez, mediator of the Venezuela-Colombia Crisis], 
Libertad Digital, http://www.libertaddigital.com/mundo/baile-de-elogios-entre-chavez-y-leonel-fernandez-
mediador-en-la-crisis-venezuela-colombia-1276391975/ (Accessed April 15, 2016).  
70 Perez, Maximo Manuel. 2010. “Chavez pide a Fernandez que aplace sus gestiones de mediación entre Venezuela 
y Colombia” [Chavez Asks Fernandez to Delay his Mediations between Venezuela and Colombia], El Dia, 
http://eldia.com.do/chavez-pide-a-fernandez-aplace-sus-gestiones-de-mediacion-entre-venezuela-y-colombia/ 
(Accessed April 15, 2016).  
71 Interview with Alfredo Toro Carnevalli, Deputy Political Coordinator, United Nations Security Council, 




the Caribbean and Central American countries, is to assure the support of the region in international 
forums and organizations, being the Organization of American States (OAS) a good example. For 
instance, the ALBA imposed its majority to forbid an OAS’s resolution regarding the acts of 
violence taking place in Venezuela in 2014. In March of 2014 OAS decided to define a resolution 
towards the violent conflicts in Venezuela and after an eight hour meeting “the support of the 
ALBA bloc72 and the CARICOM73 countries achieved to forbid that the member States adopted a 
series of resolutions that were going to be discussed: a consultancy meeting convocation for the 
chancellors; sending a commission of observation or the draft of a resolution to the conflict74”. In 
public declarations, the Venezuelan ambassador for OAS, Roy Chardeton, stated that this action 
evidenced an achievement to refrain to stop the interventionist purposes75.  Another example of 
support happened when the relations between Venezuela and the United States became tenser after 
Washington freeze the accounts of seven Venezuelan officials and also declared Venezuela a great 
security threat to the North American country. However, in a 2015 ALBA Summit celebrated in 
Caracas the ALBA countries ratified their support to Venezuela, including Cuba which was in the 
process of negotiating its relation with the United States. Among the presidents present in the 
Summit who expressed their support were Evo Morales from Bolivia, Daniel Ortega from 
                                                          
72 By 2014, the members of the ALBA bloc that are also members of OAS are Bolivia, Nicaragua, Dominica, 
Ecuador, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Antigua & Barbuda, St. Kitts & Nieves and Grenada. ALBA-TCP. 
“Member Countries,” http://alba-tcp.org/en/albatcp (Accessed April 15, 2016).   
73 By 2014, the members of the CARICOM that are also members of OAS are Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, 
Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat (a British overseas territory in the 
Leeward Islands), Saint Kitts and Nevis, SaintLucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and 
Tobago (CARICOM Official Web Page).  
74 Saiz, Eva. 2014. “El ALBA impone su mayoria e impide una resolución en la OEA sobre Venezuela” [ALBA 
Impose its Majority and Prevent a Resolution at the OAS about Venezuela], El Pais, 
http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2014/03/07/actualidad/1394169358_768151.html?rel=mas (Accessed 
April 15, 2016).  




Nicaragua and Raul Castro from Cuba, and the first ministers of St. Vincent &  Grenadines, St. 
Cristobal and Nieves, Dominica, Granada and Antigua & Barbuda76.  
However, ALBA and Petro Caribe members’ support is not the norm. In 2015 six countries 
that are member of the Petro Caribe agreement voted in favor of a Colombian proposal which 
convoke to an OAS chancellor meeting in order to debate the board crisis between Colombia and 
Venezuela. Guyana, Guatemala, Jamaica, El Salvador, St. Lucia and Bahamas are among the 17 
countries that voted in favor of Colombia and which are members of Petro Caribe77. However, 
Colombia did not get enough votes for its petition; against Colombia’s petition voted Ecuador, 
Haiti, Nicaragua, Venezuela and Bolivia and 11 countries abstain to vote78. The Venezuelan oil 
expert Alfredo Toro Hardy stated in a news report, that the Caribbean nations are not that 
supportive of Venezuela anymore because “PDVSA has not being able to supply the same amount 
of oil to the states members of Petro Caribe;” Hardy also stated that due to the fall in the oil prices 
and the fiscal deficit that Venezuela faces, the country is not under conditions to keep its generosity 
with the Petro Caribe beneficiaries79.  
Yet, ALBA by itself is an achievement of the Venezuelan international initiatives. This 
bloc started only with Venezuela and Cuba as permanent members in 2004 and over 10 years later 
                                                          
76 2015. “ALBA da apoyo a Venezuela por crisis con Estados Unidos” [ALBA Gives Support to Venezuela for 
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it counts with a total of 11 permanent members including 6 countries of the Caribbean (Cuba, 
Dominica, St. Vincent and The Grenadines, Antigua & Barbuda, St, Lucia, and St. Kitts & Nevis), 
three of South America (Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador) and one of Central America 
(Nicaragua). Moreover, the ALBA scheme was extended to other regional agreements such as 
Petro Caribe. As stated above, the ALBA Bank is used to channel the exchange activities of the 
Petro Caribe members, also the mechanism of barter implemented in Petro Caribe is used to supply 
ALBA institutions.  
IV. Conclusions 
 The role of Venezuela as a significant international lender had a gradual transformation 
having two crucial moments, the mid-1970s that marked the oil bonanza and 1999 with the arrival 
of Chávez to power and the beginning of the ‘Bolivarian Revolution.’ Throughout these years, 
Venezuelan governments pursued the nationalization of the oil industry and assumed an active role 
in the international field. Yet, there were three key differences between the Venezuelan loans in 
the 1970s and in the 2000s. First, during the Pérez’s regime the international grants and loans were 
mainly allocated through multilateral organizations whereas in the Chávez’s administration the 
loans were mainly bilateral and promoted the strengthening of the state institutions. For instance, 
one of the conditionality of Petro Caribe is that private oil industries are not allowed to participate 
in the agreement. Second, even though the ‘Bolivarian’ discourse was present in the Venezuelan 
political scenario throughout the years, Chávez assumed the Bolivarian Revolution in a more 
radical sense than his predecessors, furthermore, Chávez openly declared his objective of 
promoting a multipolar world by providing more self-determination for the Latin American region. 
Third, the loans allocated during the 1970s and 1980s lacked the formal scheme developed in the 




of formality, Mexico shared with Venezuela the role of supplier, aspect that changed in the 
following energy agreements (such as the Caracas Agreement and Petro Caribe) in which 
Venezuela became the solely provider.  
 The creation and development of ALBA-TCP became the core of Chávez’s Bolivarian 
diplomatic agenda. Furthermore, as pointed out by Burges (2007) this scheme is a representation 
of a counter-hegemonic practice. First of all, it was created as a reaction to the Free Trade Area of 
the Americas (FTAA) which Chávez categorized as another form of American imperialism. In 
contrast, ALBA-TCP will be formed within Latin America and only for Latin America. Its concept 
was beyond commercial exchange to also include the sharing of political and social values, which 
is exactly what Cox enumerates as necessary for a counter-hegemonic practice: a structural change 
that encompasses the economic, social and political spheres. Even though ALBA’s effectiveness 
is questioned, due to its limited members and scope of action, this bloc evolved from two 
participants (Venezuela and Cuba) to 11 members by 2016. As noted before, this bloc has an actual 
internal commercial trade, composed mainly of oil and food, it shares a left-wing political value 
among its members, and has demonstrated its alliance in international organizations such as the 
OAS. Even though Petro Caribe was created as a separate agreement, ALBA is its foundation and 
at moments both intertwine (for instance, when Petro Caribe members make their payments in 
goods that serve to supply ALBA institutions, such as ALBA Food). Yet the most important 
distinction between Petro Caribe and ALBA is the loan component that is mainly present in Petro 
Caribe. Petro Caribe members create a bloc that is unified by a common debt, thus if the debt is 






Chapter Two  
Venezuela Receiving Foreign Loans 
I. Introduction 
 In the previous chapter was analyzed Venezuela as lender through the supply of oil under 
concessional terms. It was stated the high dependency on oil prices and exports for the Venezuelan 
economy which was reflected in surplus under oil bonanza and deficits under decreasing oil prices. 
Prior to the Chávez’s administration the Venezuelan state borrowed abroad to finance local 
projects and to cover public deficits, being the principal source of those loans multilateral 
organizations such as the IMF. However, during the Chávez’s administration most of the state 
loans were bilateral being China its principal lender under the type of oil-for-loans. Thus, as oil 
was the commodity that attracted Venezuela’s borrowers, it was the same resource that attracted 
its principal lenders. The aim of this section is to analyze how the role of Venezuela as borrower 
of loans impacted the country’s hierarchical relations in international relations. The following 
questions are addressed: why is Venezuela continuing to receive foreign loans? What type of loans 
the country receives and under what conditions? How Venezuela’s increasing debt to China 
transforms the hierarchical relation between the two countries, is China relationship with 
Venezuela becoming more hierarchical recently? And, how do loans to Venezuela transform 









II. Literature Review 
As any other developing country Venezuela has been the target of foreign aid in forms of 
grants and loans. However, since 1999 the country’s open opposition towards neoliberalism and 
the international institutions influenced by the United States (such as the IMF and the World Bank) 
limited Venezuela’s alternatives of international lenders. Yet, when it comes to foreign credit, 
China stand out as Venezuela’s main provider of bilateral loans (Toro 2016). In the book Turning 
the World Upside Down, Alfredo Toro Hardy (2013) argues that the increased commercial 
relations between China and Latin America is a representation of the shift that is taking place in 
the global economy. He notes that in 1990 the total imports that came from China to Latin America 
represented a 0.6%, however, by 2011 China represented a 14% of the total regional imports; also, 
by 1990 China was listed as No. 17 for Latin American exports and by 2011, China “represented 
9% of total regional exports” (Toro Hardy 2013: 115). The author points out that in the Asia-
Pacific area, China surpassed Japan and South Korea, countries that have been trading with Latin 
America since the 1970s.  
Toro Hardy emphasizes that this increase in commercial relations had more significance 
for the Latin American countries than for China: “the robust growth observed in Latin American 
countries in the past decade is an important measure of its connections to China…between 2000 
and 2006, 70% of the export growth in Latin America was explained by the growth in the export 
of commodities to China…however, for China the implications of this current new trade with Latin 
America have been much more modest…in 2011, it accounted for 6% of China’s total exports and 
7% of its imports” (Toro Hardy 2013: 118). However, China has not only increased trade 
transactions with Latin America but also investments through the allocation of grants and the 




macroeconomic measure attached which it is more attractive than the conditionality of the loans 
offered by traditional lenders such as the World Bank and the IMF. Moreover, China is not only 
offering free conditionality credits but also bigger amounts: through the “China Development 
Bank, and other institutions have spent an estimated USD$75 billion on financial investments in 
South America, which is more than the World Bank, the US Export Bank and the Inter-American 
Development Bank put together” (Toro Hardy 2013: 165). Toro Hardy emphasizes that the interest 
for Latin America is due to China’s wanting access to resources of the region. The author points 
out the special importance of oil for China, according to “the 2004 projections of the US 
Department of Energy, both China and the United States would be importing around 70% of their 
oil requirements in 2025…Venezuela, Brazil and the other South American producers will be in 
position to provide such additional oil with Venezuela alone probably duplicating Saudi Arabia’s 
reserves” (Toro Hardy 2013: 161).  
In contrast to Toro Hardy who asserts that the allocation of Chinese investment respond to 
the country’s desire to access the resources of its recipients and borrowers, Deborah Brautigam 
argues in her book The Dragon’s Gift the Real Story of China in Africa, that access to resources is 
a partial answer to China’s motivations because as the rest of the countries, China uses foreign aid 
as a tool of foreign policy. She asserts that China gives aid for three reasons which are “strategic 
diplomacy, commercial benefit, and as a reflection of society’s ideologies and values” (Brautigam 
2013: 15). According to Brautigam there are several factors that make China a particular donor 
and lender: it is a developing country, that is recipient itself, with its own development success 
which gives it credibility as a development partner; the emergence of Chinese institutions, such as 
the Chinese International Development Bank, stepped in to directly compete with other lending 




ex-colonizers to ex-colonies, China’s aid has different origins which is based in its long tradition 
of commercial exchange with smaller countries; foreign aid has become an instrument of Chinese 
state leaders to improve China’s exports and its own development; hence, China conceives foreign 
aid as a partnership that creates benefits for donor/lender and recipient/borrower, for instance 
China ties its foreign aid funds to Chinese goods and services. Another characteristic of China in 
this respect is the system of subsidies by offering preferential loans and export credits.  
Brautigam also describes the evolution of China’s foreign aid and allocation of loans. She 
asserts that China’s aid is not a recent phenomenon, since the 1970s this country was considering 
the implications of assuming a formal role in foreign aid, moreover, around that time foreign aid 
was used as a diplomatic strategy. For instance “votes from African countries enabled communist 
China to finally be seated at the United Nations in 1971” (Brautigam 2013: 42). By 1984, Chinese 
leaders established a trial guidelines for overseas joint ventures being an important point the link 
between aid and investment which “could potentially allow the Chinese to address three goals at 
once: a growing backlog of unpaid aid loans, consolidation of former aid projects, and experience 
(and maybe profits) for China’s new corporations” (Brautigam 2013: 62). During the 1990s, China 
implemented a series of reforms that shaped China’s aid programs, being a relevant one the 
creation in 1994 of three ‘policy banks,’ “the China Development Bank, China Export Import Bank 
and China Agricultural Development Bank…the centerpiece of the reforms was the launch in 1995 
of a new system of concessional aid loans, offered through China’s Eximbank” (Brautigam 2013: 
79). Brautigam emphasizes that China has a typical East Asian Development State whose principal 
characteristic is the state control over finance (Brautigam 2013: 80). For instance, policy banks 
operate mainly as tools of the government, being one of them the Eximbank. By 2007, China 




Brautigan points out that Eximbank’s “concessional loans are the only part of their operations that 
can be called foreign aid” (Brautigam 2013: 114), and the subsidy for the interest rate of such 
concessional loans comes from the Chinese government’s foreign aid budget. The author 
emphasizes that China’s government is not geared towards debts cancellations, for instance, the 
Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) was a debt reduction program launched in 1996 by the 
OECD bilateral donors, however, “Beijing was slow to accept the position that debt owed to China 
should be canceled outright” (Brautigam 2013: 128). Brautigan concludes that China’s novel ‘win-
win’ approach consists of “using very large credits, at competitive market rates, tied to Chinese 
machinery, equipment, and construction services, with repayments in oil or other resources” 
(Brautigam 2013: 307).  
The increased commercial relation between China and Latin America, but specifically, 
China’s concession of loans is addressed in the Inter-American Dialogue report “The New Banks 
in Town: Chinese Finance in Latin America,” by Kevin P. Gallagher, Amos Irwin and Katherine 
Koleski. The authors argue that the common claims about Chinese loans in Latin America which 
assert that they have more favorable terms, impose no policy conditions, and have less stringent 
environmental guidelines than the loans of Western governments or international institutions are 
not completely accurate. They conclude that argument by making a comparative analysis of the 
amount, conditionality and terms of the loans provided by the Chinese government in contrast to 
the loans provided by the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and United States 
Export-Import Bank in Latin America. First, by comparing the amount of Chinese loans in Latin 
America, the authors assert that China has become a major financial source for the region, 
especially for South America. China’s loans to the region doubled every year between 2008 and 




billion, passing the World Bank’s USD$14 billion and IDB’s USD$15 billion. In 2010, lending 
doubled once more to $37 billion, well above loan levels of the World Bank (USD$14 billion) and 
IDB (USD$12 billion)” (Gallagher, Irwin and Koleski 2012: 7). The report notes that the large 
amount of loans is concentrated on a few borrowers such as Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina and 
Ecuador, countries that received the 90% of the $75 billion that China allocated in the region since 
2005. The authors emphasize that China is the ‘lender of last resort’ because it is not a cheap one. 
Countries such as Venezuela, Ecuador and Argentina are not attractive borrowers for the 
mainstream market due to the high debts of their economics, and in the case of Argentina and 
Ecuador, their precedence of default in 2001 and 2008-2009 respectively (Gallagher, Irwin and 
Koleski 2012: 8). However, in order for China to secure its payments from these highly indebted 
countries, China used “its loans-for-oil and purchase requirements to reduce the cost of lending to 
these otherwise non-creditworthy borrowers….Chinese Development Bank does not subsidize its 
interest rates as development aid or to outcompete other lenders, instead offering the loans at 
cost…The risk mitigation of loans-for-oil seems to explain why CDB was able to offer the $20 
billion Venezuelan loan at a floating rate of 50-285 basis points over LIBOR, only a fraction of its 
935 basis point cost in sovereign debt markets (Gallagher, Irwin and Koleski 2012: 9). Another 
key point made in the report is that the CDB is backed up by the Chinese government, and failure 
to repay this institution jeopardize the bilateral relations and future deals with Chinese firms. 
Even though China has become an alternative for the countries that cannot recur to the 
mainstream lenders, the conditions of the Chinese loans are not that ‘sweet,’ especially when it 
comes to their loans-for-oil package. According to the report, “a loan-for-oil generally combines 
a loan agreement and an oil-sale agreement that involves two countries’ state-owned banks and oil 




highly used by China in the last decade, the authors point out that they did not ‘invented’ it, 
conversely, Japan gave China loans for its oil in the 1970s, and “now that China imports oil and 
exports technology, it has copied Japan’s deal” (Gallagher, Irwin and Koleski 2012: 15). 
According to the report, there are six reasons why loans-for-oil results beneficial for China: they 
“help China establish diverse, long-term oil supply chains, promote Chinese exports, put dollar 
reserves to productive use, expand the international usage of the Chinese yuan, and win favor with 
borrowing governments” (Gallagher, Irwin and Koleski 2012: 15). However, this type of loans 
might not result that favorable for the borrowers. The authors give as example the case of 
Venezuela, country that is highly indebted with China under the loan-for-oil terms. Venezuela 
“agreed on a ten-year, $20 billion loan-for-oil in 2010. To pay this loan back with $110 barrels 
over the ten-year tenor, Venezuela would only have to send 50,000 barrels per day. However, 
Venezuela committed to send 200,000 to 300,000 barrels per day to China, four to six times as 
much. By incorporating the repayment into a larger supply contract, Venezuela can truthfully say 
that CDB will only deduct a portion of the revenues to cover loan interest, while the rest will return 
to Venezuela. Today, Venezuela has signed so many loans-for-oil that it allows China to keep $70 
per barrel to pay back the loans, while China refunds the remaining $40 or so according to market 
prices” (Gallagher, Irwin and Koleski 2012: 14).  In contrast, Brazil and Ecuador, which also take 
loans-for oil with China, can retain a larger percentage of the oil revenue because they have smaller 
loans.  
A key point noted in the report is that the oil is not collateral to the loans which means that 
if the borrowers threaten to cut oil supply, the Chinese Development Bank cannot seize extra oil 
or oil revenue to compensate. However, there are certain strings in the Chinese loans that safeguard 




return for financing. Instead, Chinese banks usually force borrowers to spend a share of the loan 
on Chinese goods” (Gallagher, Irwin and Koleski 2012: 18). Besides, Chinese banks almost always 
tie their loans to the purchase of Chinese goods, according to the report, “we found conditions in 
every loan requiring the borrower to purchase Chinese construction, oil, telecommunications, 
satellite, and train equipment…since Venezuela committed to spend the majority of its $20 billion 
loan in 2010 on Chinese goods and services, CDB denominated half in Chinese yuan (De Córdoba 
2011). This is the largest Chinese-currency loan to date…the purchase requirements allow Chinese 
banks to reduce their exposure to default risk” (Gallagher, Irwin and Koleski 2012: 19). However, 
the authors conclude that Latin American and Caribbean countries pay a higher premium for the 
Chinese loans which is due to the interest rates and not to the loans-for-oil. They assert that their 
analysis shows that “the majority of Chinese loans-for-oil in Latin America are linked to market 
prices, not quantities of oil. Meanwhile, the loans are often tied to working with Chinese 
contractors and businesses, and that condition represents another cost because it reduces the 
‘spillover’ effect in terms of local contracting in Latin America and the Caribbean” (Gallagher, 
Irwin and Koleski 2012: 27).  
By analyzing the specific relations between China and Venezuela, in the article “Venezuela 
and China Economic Relations in the Regime of Hugo Chávez,” Silvia Hernandez Rada argues 
that the bilateral relations between China and Venezuela increased during the Chávez’s 
administration which responds to strategic interests from both sides: due to the friction between 
Venezuela and the United States, Venezuela needs to diversify its markets and also the country 
needs financial support to continue its socialist economic model. China on the other hand, needs 
energy resources that are critical for maintaining its level of development. The author points out 




until 1998, to 300 agreements during 1999-2011. She asserts that the interest from Venezuela to 
China is based in three actions of foreign policy: “petro-diplomacy, the necessity to diversify the 
markets, and a shared vision of a common enemy, the United States” (Hernandez Rada 2011: 4). 
Hernandez Rada defines petro-diplomacy as the co-relation of energy interests which become 
strategic for the development and materialization of international agreements in this area. She 
emphasizes that in this respect China has become a country dependent on natural resources which 
needs in order to maintain its level of development, furthermore, if China wants to become a world 
power it needs energy security (Hernandez Rada 2011: 4). The author points out that by 2009, 
China’s consumption of energy surpassed the consumption of Russia, Brazil and India and its 
demand will become near of the consumption in Europe and the United States. However, even 
though China has a dependency on oil resources, the country has several suppliers to satisfy its 
demand by having oil contracts in Africa, Centro-Asia and South America. Hernandez Rada 
emphasizes that just as China seeks to diversify its markets, Venezuela also seeks that 
diversification in order not to depend only on the United States, even though it is its principal 
commercial partner. The author asserts that China’s purpose is to increase its resources and satisfy 
its necessities regardless of which country is going to become its strategic partner (Hernandez 
Rada 2011: 10). In her conclusions, Hernandez Rada points out that the relations between China 
and Venezuela are sustained in the Chinese loans to Venezuela, “which accentuate the dependence 
of Chávez’s administration for the sustainability of the Bolivarian Revolution, but also it impairs 
the successive governments and whole generations because the payments are based in future 
supply of oil” (Hernandez Rada 2011: 22). Moreover, the author asserts that China is a bigger 
winner out of the relation with Venezuela because China gets access to oil for their consumption 




China also introduces its products in the Venezuelan market and gets a “political counterbalance 
in America which goes in line with its interests” (Hernandez Rada 2011: 25).  
In the article “The Relation between China and Venezuela,” Evan Ellis also analysis the 
specific relation between the two countries during the Chávez’s administration from a strategic 
point of view. The author asserts that China “meets” Venezuela as one of its four strategic partners 
in Latin America with an increase in bilateral agreements that includes more than USD$28 billion 
in loans and USD$16 billion in investment compromises by 2009 (Ellis 2010: 31). The approach 
of his article is to analyze the interests of both China and Venezuela in the expansion of their 
relations. Ellis argues that China’s main benefits is the access to resources and markets in 
Venezuela, “with the risk that China’s relation with Venezuela could create problems with their 
relation with the United States which is strategically more important” (Ellis 2010: 31). In the case 
of Venezuela, China’s support prolong the capacity of Chávez’s regime to finance revolutionary 
activities both locally and in the region, “but it creates a fundamental cycle of debt and dependency 
that is going to be unsustainable” (Ellis 2010:31). The author enumerates three interests from 
China to have presence in Venezuela: first, gain access to basic goods; second, to increase the sale 
of Chinese products in important sectors and with higher value; and third, to keep a political and 
economic space in the Americas where the Chinese can operate (Ellis 2010: 31). Ellis emphasizes 
that even though China has shown interest for other Venezuelan resources, such as metal and 
minerals, its main focus is on oil. This interest is mainly due to the Venezuelan considerable 
reserves: “according to measures by the Geology Survey of the United States, the Orinoco Basin 
of Venezuela can contain up to USD$1,5 trillion of oil barrels, of which around USD$513 billion 
barrels can be extracted, making Venezuelan total oil reserves bigger than the combined reserves 




This interest for Venezuelan oil is reflected in the mechanisms of payment of the Chinese 
loans. Ellis remarks that one out of three big loans from China to Venezuela since 2007 have been 
under future supply of Venezuelan oil. For instance, in order to clear off the USD$8 billion that 
China contributed to the Chinese-Venezuelan Fund in 2010, Venezuela has sent an average of 
100,000 barrels of oil per day. Also, a USD$20 billion loan agreed in April of 2010 will be paid 
off in a period of 10 years with the supply of 100,000 additional barrels per day (Ellis 2010: 32). 
The author notes the importance that China gives to other sectors, such as mining, and to the 
introduction of its products in the Venezuelan market. For instance, through an agreement of May 
2010, the Chinese company Haier sold 300,000 Chinese appliances which the Venezuelan 
government would sell at the state warehouses. The commercial relations have also included 
telecommunications and security apparatus, airplanes, and China even launched a satellite for 
Venezuela (Ellis 2010: 33). Ellis asserts that Venezuela represents a strategic allied in the region 
to support China’s intent to change the position of those nations that recognize Taiwan as an 
independent country; “11 of the 23 of the countries in the world that recognize Taiwan are from 
Central America and the Caribbean. Most of those nations depend on Venezuela for the supply of 
oil, which they receive under favorable conditions of payment through the Petro Caribe 
agreement” (Ellis 2010: 35). Regarding the benefits for Venezuela, Ellis argues that China 
contributes to the viability of Chávez’s regime through five elements: it serves as a source of funds 
in a short term; it helps to extract raw materials from Venezuela; it diversifies the export markets 
for the country; it creates symbolic projects for the national consumption; and it serves as 
alternative provider of military products of second level (Ellis 2010: 32). The author concludes 
that the increased bilateral relation between the two countries has incentives but significant risks 




pursued by Chávez and also not getting involved in the economic and political crisis of the regime. 
Whereas for Venezuela the major risks are the increased dependence on China for loans to cover 
the regime expenses, dependency on China to extract Venezuelan oil and other resources and the 
unsustainability of the debt.  
Since loans are a crucial element in the relations between China and Venezuela, it is 
relevant to consider the blurry line between concessional loans and regular loans, each having 
different implications for the lender and the borrower. In his article “Economics and Politics of 
Official Loans versus Grants,” Matthew Odedokun examines at an academic level, the 
implications of allocating official assistance whether in loans or grants, and the differences 
between concessional and non-concessional loans. In his analysis he makes the distinction between 
concessional or subsidized loans and non-concessional loans by stating that “a concessional loan 
(which is the one that is currently in vogue) is a subsidized credit and, by definition, has a grant 
element built into it and can therefore be conceptualized as a grant when it is being compared with 
a non-concessional loan” (Odedokun 2003: 2). Based in his empirical analysis, Odedokun argues 
that subsidized loans are less efficient for the state receiving the loans because they tend to over 
borrow and thus to assume a bigger debt burden. The author asserts that since concessional loans 
is another name for subsidized loans, “the effects of different degrees of softness or concession 
can be analyzed and theoretically predicted on the basis of the economic theory on subsidy of a 
commodity or factor input” (Odedokun 2003:18). Odedokun points out that the degree of 
concession of a loan is measured by the implied grant element in relation to the face value of the 
loan. Such grant element is defined by the author as the rate of interest on the loan and the grace 
period, which is the timeframe before repayment of the principal. Thus, “the lower the loan rate or 




The approach used in Odedokun’s article is to explain through empirical data the 
differences in the mix use of grants and loans allocation by using annual panel data between 1970 
and 1999 pooled across 17 member countries of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 
of the OECD. The indicators used by the author are Level of donors’ per capita income; Economic 
(real GDP) growth; the phase of economic cycle; Size of government—government expenditure 
in relation to GDP; Ideological leaning of the donor government; Political constraints and checks 
and balances against executive arm of Government; Trend variable; and Dummy variable for post-
1990 period. He concludes by suggesting the “necessity to separate concessional loans into two 
constituent parts: pure grants and non-concessional loans. This would entail the recipient being 
given the grant component, coupled with the option to take as much as it wishes from the non-
concessional loan component….this would overcome many of the adverse incentives and related 
problems of concessional loans” (Odedokun 2003: 29). 
According to the reviewed authors the relation between China and Venezuela is mainly 
based in a mutual need: oil and natural resources from the Chinese side and money and investment 
from the Venezuelan side. Both countries seek to diversify their markets and in the case of 
Venezuela, they seek an alternative market different from the United States. Also, the authors 
emphasize the risk of an accruing debt for Venezuela which can become unsustainable. Yet, there 








III-A. Venezuela as Borrower  
The role of Venezuela as borrower is based in two main factors: first, even though the 
Venezuelan economy has been highly dependent on oil prices, the oil bonanzas has not translated 
into less external public debt, conversely, high levels of debt have coincided with oil booms. 
Second, since the Venezuelan state assumed a social spending at the local level and at the 
international level through the concession of loans abroad, there was the need for more resources 
to continue such spending. These two factors took place previous the Chávez era and during his 
term, however under different circumstances.  
According to the article “Associated Factors of Public Debt in Venezuela,” by Jorge Lopez 
Palma (1998), by the end of the 1990s Venezuela had a public external debt problem which 
inherited from the accelerated acquisition of foreign loans during 1974-1982. Lopez Palma’s 
analysis demonstrates that Venezuela’s high level of debt occurred almost simultaneously with the 
oil bonanza of the mid-1970s. During the first term of Carlos Andres Perez’s presidency, the deficit 
of the state happened almost simultaneously with the petrodollars boom and the solution was to 
borrow abroad. Lopez Palma asserts that “Venezuela received an average of USD$1000 million 
annually in loans during the so-called oil bonanza. In the second stage of the oil bonanza, under 
the Campin’s administration, emerged the second wave of borrowing when the foreign loans 
annual rated increased to USD$2,600 million; this established an annual average debt of 
USD$1,900 million” (Lopez Palma 1998:71). Lopez Palma states that the external Venezuelan 
debt accelerated during the first presidency of Carlos Andres Perez (1974-1979) and the principal 
factors that contributed to this were the premise that oil prices will increase to USD$40 per barrel, 
and also the liberalization of the transnational banc to approve, without much restrictions, the so-




evolution of the external public debt of Venezuela during 1969-1988, period that encompasses 
four different presidential terms. As the figure shows, the biggest increase occurred in 1974-1975, 
when the annual average rate of the external public debt increased from 27.2% to 51.5%.  
Figure 4. Evolution of the External Public Debt in Venezuela 1969-1988 (Millions of 
Bolivares) 
 
Source: Lopez Palma, 1998: 62.  
 
During the first term of Pérez’s presidency there was the oil boom in the 1970s which led 
the state to implement a ‘Great Project’ that included, among other things, “the nationalization of 
the oil and metal industry, the recuperation of the social security, the creation of an Investment 
Fund, the development of Guyana and the construction of regional aqueducts80”. Yet, the 
governments of Luis Herrera Campins (1979-1984) and Jaime Lusinchi (1984-1989) also 
increased the public debt with an annual average rate of 36% and 19.8% respectively (Lopez Palma 
1998: 63).  
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Lopez Palma asserts that there were three main sources that Venezuela recurred for foreign 
loans: the bilateral assistance for development; the private foreign direct investment; and the 
credits of the imports given by the same sellers (Lopez Palma 1998:70). However, during the 1974-
1989 period, Venezuela recurred to multilateral organizations as its main lender. For instance, in 
1989 during the second term of Pérez, the Venezuelan economy assumed a restructuration of the 
external debt under the IMF, which included a program of high conditionality (Lopez Palma 1998: 
64). The author notes that when the oil exports started to fall in 1975 Perez’s administration 
decided to recur to external loans to cover the public deficit, instead of implementing unpopular 
measures on the population (such as raising taxes). This was combined with an increment of the 
State spending and the imports into the country. Lopez Palma concludes that the problem of public 
debt in Venezuela during 1974-1997 had two defined phases: accelerated public external debt 
(1974-1982) and the cancelation of the debts with recessive consequences and greater external 
control of the internal political economy (from 1983 on) (Lopez Palma 1998: 73).  
According to the authors Thomas Legler (2007) and Jennifer McCoy (2004), when Chávez 
arrived to power he did not have an economic plan, moreover, he just followed the steps of the 
Punto Fijo’s governments which was “raising oil prices through curtailing production, hence, he 
had a purely oil dependent economy without any diversification into other sectors” (McCoy 2004: 
287). As can be noted in figure five, during the 1990s the exports mainly concentrated on oil, 




Figure 5. Public Oil and Non-Oil Exports 1989-2015 (US$M) 
 
Source: Venezuelan Central Bank: Series of Venezuelan Statistics 2016. 
 
Within the first six years of Chávez’s presidency, his administration faced a strike from 
PDVSA executives who were hostile to the government which affected the oil production and thus 
oil revenues (Weisbrot 2011: 197). As figure six shows, by 2001 and 2002 Venezuela was on 
deficit which increased in 2003 but recovered in the two following years.  
Figure 6. Cash Surplus/Deficit (GDP%) 
 







































































































































In contrast to the loans during times of revenue in the mid-1970s, Mark Weisbrot (2011) 
points out that Chávez’s regime used the oil revenues to alleviate the public and external debt that 
the country had acquired: “total public debt had increased through the crisis of 2002-2003, 
reaching a peak of 47.6% of GDP in 2003, with the foreign part of that at 29.7%. But by 2008 the 
public debt had been reduced to just 14.2 percent of GDP, with the foreign public debt at only 
9.6%. This rouse in the recession to 18.4% and 10.8%, respectively. If we were to include the 
foreign debt of PDVSA and other state-owned enterprises, the total debt would rise to 
26%....Venezuela ran a huge current account surplus of 12.6 percent for 2008, although this 
collapsed to 2.6 percent for 2009…what happened was obvious, the current account went into 
deficit for just the fourth quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009-when oil prices crashed. It 
rebounded quickly into surplus in the next two quarters as oil prices recovered” (Weisbrot 2011: 
206). However, according to statistics of the Venezuelan Central Bank (2016), even though the 
external public debt was reduced in 2008, it incremented again in the following years. As figure 
seven shows, by 2009 and 2012 the debt was higher than in 2006 and 2007, yet it didn’t reach the 
peak of 2003.  
Figure 7. Public External Debt GDP% (End of Period) 
 













The second cause of needing external funds is the social spending that the Venezuelan state 
underwent during the Chávez era. At the local level, “the central government social spending from 
1998 to 2008…there has been a huge increase, from 11.3% of GDP in 1998 to 18.6% for 2008. In 
real (inflation-adjusted) terms, social spending per person has nearly tripled, increasing by 191% 
over the period 1998-2008” (Weisbrot 2011: 203). McCoy points out that “by 2003 facing the 
building toward a recall referendum, Chávez expanded fiscal policy and initiated a number of new 
social programs to bring medical care, literacy programs, and supermarkets into poor 
neighborhoods” (McCoy 2004: 287). In 2015, despite the economic slowdown, Maduro’s 
administration announced an increase in the state budget with a “heightened investment in pension 
programs, healthcare and university expansion. The plan totaling around USD$117.7 billion 
represents a 35% overall increase from the 2014 budget. Proportionally, 34% more funds will be 
invested in social programs in 2015 than in 201481”. In a national televised discourse, Maduro 
asserted that throughout the 15 of the ‘Bolivarian Revolution’ the government has on average 
invested 60% of its budget in social services, “which Maduro says he intends to maintain despite 
economic challenges…Venezuelan government has overseen a 15% increase in salary for workers 
and pensions82”.  
As noted in the first chapter, spending money abroad was one of the main characteristics 
of Chávez’s administration. For instance, “from 2005 to 2007 alone, Chávez gave away a total of 
$39 billion in oil and cash; $9.9 billion to Argentina, $7 billion to Cuba, $4.9 billion to Ecuador, 
and $4.9 billion to Nicaragua” (Schoen and Rowan 2009: 83). Other estimations ascend to US$43 
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billion since 1999; in declarations of the ex-officer of PDVSA, Gustavo Coronel, for an article of 
The Economist, out of the US$43 billion worth of foreign commitment, “roughly $17 billion could 
be described as aid, including cheap oil to Cuba and cash transfers to Bolivia…Venezuela's cheap-
oil program alone is worth $1.7 billion a year, though its most flamboyant feature83”. In another 
article published by Coronel (2006), he asserts that the Venezuelan state annual planned spending 
was above the annual income that the state could receive. Colonel makes a list of the compromises 
abroad assumed by the Chávez’s administration by 2006: 
Table 12. Financial Compromises of Venezuela 1999-2013 
Country/Institution Amount US$ Purpose 
Argentina 3,900 million To buy bonds of Argentinian debt. 
Bolivia 60 million Donation for social causes not specified.  
Brazil 4,600 million Destined to a refinery in Pernambuco; purchase of 20 Tucanos 
airplanes and 28 tanks for PDVSA. 
Andean Community 50 million Humanitarian aid not specified. 
Petro Caribe countries 540 million Worth of subsidized oil. 
Cuba 4,400 million Worth of subsidized oil and other oil production projects.  
Ecuador 25 million Worth of purchased bonds. 
United States 16 million Including resources for propaganda and donations to 
communities in Boston and NY.  
Spain 2000 million Purchase of airplanes and coast guard patrol boats.  
Guyana 12 million Cancellation of debt under unspecified terms.  
Jamaica 600 million For infrastructure and development of a refinery in Kingston.  
Paraguay 625 million Subsided oil and development of a refinery.  
Dominican Republic 156 million For infrastructure 
Source: Coronel 2006: Chavorragia Financiera84.  
 
Even though it results counterintuitive that a country under oil bonanza and with high social 
spending locally and abroad would request foreign loans, the case of Venezuela demonstrates that 
is precisely the high level of spending and the over trust in high oil prices which made foreign 
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loans the most viable solution to compensate the deficit at home without imposing unpopular 
measures on the citizenry.  
III-B Venezuela’s Lenders, Type of Loans and their Conditionality 
 During the Chávez’s era China had become Venezuela’s most important lender, being the 
loan-for-oil type the principal terms of the Chinese credits. The supply of oil under the market 
prices became the principal downside of the loans agreements between China and Venezuela. To 
a lesser extent, Venezuela had also received bilateral loans from other countries, for instance 
Russia, Japan and Spain. 
 Due to the amount of loans allocated in Venezuela since 2001, China has become its 
principal lender. South American countries concentrate the loans allocated from China in the 
region, being Venezuela the biggest borrower. For instance, in the period 2005-2011 Venezuela 
was the country that borrowed most money from China with a total of US$38,500 million, as the 
following table shows: 
Table 13. Chinese Lending During 2005-2011 







Costa Rica 300 
Source: Gallagher, Irwin and Koleski 2012: 6.  
According to the Forbes article “Venezuela's Future - Mortgaged By Chavismo In 
Cooperation With China,” by Paul Coyer, China took advantage of the need of the Venezuelan 




its social spending both locally and abroad. In the article is stated that according to the loans 
agreements signed between China and Venezuela, the repayments are going to be made with oil, 
and the lower the oil prices, the more oil Venezuela has to provide to China. Moreover, “when 
Caracas has gone back to Beijing seeking relief from its loan payments and to seek more loans to 
keep itself afloat, China has responded both by promising more money and by lengthening the 
terms of its existing loans, which in essence means that China has a legal claim on Venezuela’s oil 
farther into the future85”. Finally, the author points out three contradictory factors that threaten the 
future of Venezuelan economy and the revenues that the country could get from its oil reserves: 
by 2016 Venezuela was in the brink of debt default, with more than US$15 billion worth of debt 
repayment coming due in the course of 2016; due to the oil quotas of the Petro Caribe program 
and the oil dedicated to the debt repayment to China, the country has little oil supply left to sell it 
to its traditional clients, such as the United States; and there is the threat of running out of their 
foreign gold reserve since the country is resorting to sell their gold, whose reserves have fallen 
from USD$43 billion to USD$11 billion in the past seven years.   
In 2007 was created the China-Venezuela Joint Investment Fund (JIF) which is a rotating 
scheme used to finance diverse projects in Venezuela in diverse areas such as infrastructure, 
transportation and agriculture86. According to a report by the Venezuela newspaper El Universal87, 
this Fund is divided in three phases, in which Venezuela through the National Development Fund 
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(FONDEM) and China through the Chinese Development Bank (CDB) made economic 
contributions to the fund; yet Chinese’s contribution are loans which Venezuela has to repay by 
supplying barrels of oil to China, however, the officials point out that the oil supply can change 
according to the oil prices. If oil prices are low, more barrels will be allocated in order to 
compensate the difference. The conditions are explained in table 14: 
Table 14. Terms of the China-Venezuela Joint Investment Fund 




US$4,000 million US$4,000 million US$5,000 million 
Venezuela’s 
Contribution 
US$2,000 million US$2,000 million US$1,000 million 
Method of 
repayment from 
Venezuela to China 
Supply China with 
100.000 barrels of oil 
daily. 
Supply China with 
130.000 barrels of oil 
daily. 
Supply China with 
100.000 barrels of oil 
daily. 
Debt Cancelation Cancelled in 2011. Cancelled in 2012. Still in process of 
payment. 
Source: Diario El Universal 201488 
However, it is important to note that the millions injected by Venezuela to the JIF are 
financed by China through the CDB. According to Hernandez Rada, since the repayment 
mechanism of this Fund contemplates the supply of oil from Venezuela to China, “Venezuela 
(PDVSA) sends oil (not less than 200 barrels per day) to China (CNPC), which is going to be paid 
in an account of BANDES that was created in the Chinese Development Bank in China, meaning, 
the revenues of the sold oil to China do not enter into the accounts of PDVSA to invest in 
production but the revenues stay in China as payment concept for the debt from Venezuela to 
China. Through this mechanism, Venezuela pays the Chinese credit for the millions that Venezuela 
injected in the Fund” (Hernandez Rada 2011: 23).  
                                                          




 According to the report “Inside China Inc.” by Erica Downs (2011), the projects financed 
by the JIF include the “satellite Simón Bolívar, five metro lines (two in Caracas and one each in 
Los Teques, Valencia and Maracaibo), the train from Cúa to Encrucijada, and the Gran Mariscal 
de Ayacucho highway” (Downs 2011: 50). In this same report is described the terms of the JIF:  
“The three-year supply contract that secures CDB’s first loan of $4 billion requires PDVSA 
to deliver 100,000 b/d of fuel oil to Chinaoil. In contrast, the three-year supply contract 
that secures CDB’s second loan of $4 billion stipulates that the volumes delivered to 
Chinaoil will fluctuate with the price oil from a minimum of 107,000 b/d when oil prices 
are above $60 per barrel to a maximum of 153,000 b/d when oil prices are below $42 per 
barrel. PDVSA’s fuel oil sales to Chinaoil will range from 207,000 b/d to 253,000 b/d 
during the period in which the two supply contracts overlap” (Downs 2011: 50). 
 In the same report is specified that in 2010 another loan was agreed between China and 
Venezuela which was separate from the Chinese-Venezuelan Fund and that ascended to USD$20 
billion. Until that date it was the “CDB’s largest foreign financing ever” (Downs 2011: 51). The 
portions of this new credit would be destined to the areas of infrastructure, energy, mining, social 
development and agricultural activities in Venezuela, according to Down. The terms of the US$20 
billion loans are as follow: “it consists of three agreements, a USD$10 billion loan to BANDES 
governed by English law; a RMB 70 billion (USD$10.6 billion) loan to BANDES governed by 
Chinese law; and an oil supply contract between PDVSA and Chinaoil governed by Venezuelan 
law. The dual credit facility, which has a ten-year term, is secured by revenue earned by PDVSA 
from the oil supply contract with Chinaoil. Ecoanalítica, an economic consultancy in Caracas, 
reported in September 2010 that it had been unofficially uninformed that the interest rate on the 




According to an article by The Economist89, the loans-for oil will not be that beneficial for 
the Venezuelan economy at the long-run: “a loan tied to oil-field investments will not necessarily 
help Venezuelan government coffers, since the state needs short-term cash to pay for salaries, 
social security, and imports, rather than long-run investments in upgraded oil rigs. Since the loan 
will be repaid in oil, it did not need to be ratified by the Venezuelan parliament (as it will not 
officially count as debt). Theoretically, that also means the government does not have to account 
for the way it is spent to its citizens, although China will be expecting it to be invested in oil. China 
will be first in line for repayment, before other creditors90”. 
The following table shows the Chinese loans to Venezuela that has been formally 
announced. As can be noted in one year the two countries formalized more than one loan, as in 
2009, 2010 and 2011. Most of the loans are channeled through the Chinese Development Bank 
and they are dedicated to infrastructure. The continuity of the loans reflect the long-term debt 
accruing from Venezuela to China. For instance, in a news report of the Camera of Commerce and 
Industry of Caracas, is specified that by 2015 “the obligation of the Venezuelan government with 
China divided among all Venezuelan citizens which is 30.620.404 habitants according to the 
Venezuelan National Institute of Statistics, is translated in a debt of US$718,47 per person91.  
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Table 15: Chinese Loans to Venezuela Formally Announced/Publicized 
Year Borrower entity Lender Amount ($m) Purpose 
2008 BANDES and PDVSA CDB 4,000 Funding infrastructure, other projects. 
2009 BANDES and PDVSA CDB 4,000 Funding infrastructure, other projects. 
2009 CVG CDB 1,000 Mining project credit. 
2010 PDVSA CDB and BES 1,500 Trade-related credit facility. 
2010 BANDES and PDVSA CDB 20,000 Funding infrastructure 
2011 PDVSA CDB 4,000 Infrastructure 
2011 PDVSA ICBC 4,000 Housing 
2013 BANDES and PDVSA CDB 5,000 Funding infrastructure, other projects 
2015 PDVSA CDB 5,000 Increase oil production 
                                      Total                                               48,500 
Sources: Figueroa 2015; Telesur 2015: “Chinese-Venezuelan Fund;” Gallagher, Irwin and 
Koleski 2012.  
 
According to Gallagher, Irwin and Koleski (2012), the type of loans used by China, 
especially in Latin America, is the loan-for-oil type of which Venezuela is its biggest borrower. 
The authors assert that the main concern from the lender side is to compromise the allocation of a 
fixed quota of oil for future time under fluctuating oil prices, meaning that if prices of oil go up 
the borrower still have to send the agreed quota, and if the prices go down more oil has to be 
supplied to cover the difference. This second scenario is the one faced by Venezuela regarding its 
loans compromises with China. As figure 8 shows, the export of Venezuelan oil to China started 
to increase at the beginning of 2000, having an important escalation between 2011 and 2012. 
However, the difficulty in this kind of loans that Venezuela is taking from China is that at the end 
Venezuela will have less oil available to sell to the profitable market. Moreover, “with so much of 
its dwindling oil production dedicated to the Petro Caribe program, which earns Venezuela no 
money, and to debt repayment to China, there is little oil left over to sell to traditional clients like 
the United States in order to make much-needed cash”92. This problem intensifies if the oil prices 
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decline because in the agreement signed by the two countries is stipulated that the cheaper the oil, 
more barrels Venezuela has to supply in order to compensate. Hence, with the decline of oil prices 
that means that Venezuela will have less of the product to sell (because it has to give great 
quantities to China) and less revenues from the oil that is left to sell93.  
Figure 8. Venezuelan Total Oil Exports of Refined Oil Products to China 1986-2012 
 
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Statistics 201694. 
 
            Even though China is Venezuela’s main lender of the last years, Russia, Japan and Spain 
have also provided bilateral loans to the country during Chávez’s administration. According to a 
news report by El Universal, in October of 2011, Russia and Venezuela signed an agreement in 
which Russia lent Venezuela USD$4.000 million with the purpose of sustaining the technical-
military cooperation between the two countries; according to the agreement Russia would give 
USD$2,000 million in 2012 and the rest in 2013. Chávez declared that this loan was to equip the 
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Venezuelan Armed Forces95. In the same article is pointed out that besides the USD$4,000 
million loan, in 2010, Venezuela received a loan from Moscow of US$2,200 million in order to 
buy tanks and missiles. However, the collaboration between the two countries is not just for the 
acquisition of arms, it also extends to oil and agricultural activities. While signing the October 
2011 loan agreement, Chávez announced the creation of the joint venture PetroMiranda in the 
Orinoco Basin, the exploration of gas in the Venezuelan Gulf and the development of the area El 
Carabobo 2, of the Orinoco Basin. In 2015, the Venezuelan government asked Russia to extend 
the period to clear off the credit received in 2011; in August of the same year “Vladimir Putin 
signed the ratification law that extends until December 31rst of 2016 the deadline for Venezuela 
to pay off the US$4,000 million to Russia”96.  
The bilateral relations between Russia and Venezuela started in March of 1945 when the 
ambassadors of both countries signed an act that formalized the relations between the two 
countries97. However, in a note by the Venezuelan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MPPRE), the 
friendship between Russia and Venezuela increased during the Chávez’s administration. For 
instance, since 2000 both countries have signed 240 agreements in the areas of energy and 
commerce98. In 2001 the two countries created the Comision Intergubernamental de Alto Nivel 
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[Intergovermental Commission of High Level]. It was accorded that the Commission would be 
under the direction of the vice presidents of Venezuela and Russia, “besides this institution would 
coordinate the consultancy and elaboration of integral proposals about the cooperation in political, 
economic, commercial, scientific, cultural, academic and environmental sectors between the two 
countries”99. The first meeting of this commission took place in 2004 and from then on the 
institution has held uninterrupted gatherings alternating the seat between the two countries. During 
the VIII Summit of the Commission in 2011 with seat in Caracas, Russia and Venezuela signed 
the following agreements: the development of the area Carabobo 2 located in the Orinoco Basin; 
the Russian loan to Venezuela of US$4,000 million to sustain the technical-military cooperation 
between Russia and Venezuela; the increase of the capital of the Russian-Venezuelan Bank100 to 
US$4,000 million; the exploration of gas Robalo in the Venezuelan Gulf; the agreement to 
accelerate the creation of the joint venture PetroMiranda in the Orinoco Gulf; the exportation of 
Venezuelan flowers to Russia; the intention to create a joint venture with the interest to produce 
plantain. In the IX Summit in 2013, which took place in Moscow, the two countries signed a 
memorandum of understanding for the production of drills and oil equipment between Petroleos 
de Venezuela Industrial and the Russian enterprise Uralmash101. However, the officials do not 
describe which the terms for the Russian credit are.  
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Another Venezuelan lender, but in a much lesser extent than China and Russia, is Japan 
which also used the loan-for-oil mechanism. In a news report by America Economia is stated that 
in 2011102 Japan lent US$1,500 million to PDVSA and as repayment Venezuela would export 3 
million barrels of oil annually for five consecutive years; the loan was conferred by the Japan Bank 
for International Cooperation (JBIC), along 8 Japanese Financial firms and two Japanese 
commercial entities. The JBIC qualified the loan as “soft” due to its low interest rate, even though 
it did not reveal the rate. In the same report, the president of PDVSA, Rafael Ramirez, discarded 
other commercial agreements between the two nations due to the great geographic distance; beside 
this transaction was made to guarantee the supply of oil to Japan after the earthquake that happened 
in March of the same year and to add resources to PDVSA in Venezuela103.  In another news report 
by El Dia, Ramirez stated that the payment period is of 15 years and the payment can be made in 
cash or oil. He also asserted that the loan will be used to finance the improvement of Venezuelan 
refineries companies El Palito and Puerto La Cruz, and “to promote the development of the 
capacity of processing the Venezuelan oil.” In the same news is stated that in 2007 PVDSA 
received its first loan from Japan of US$3,500 million104.  
Finally, according to the OECD statistic database, Spain is the only OECD country that 
allocated bilateral loans to Venezuela during the 1995-2013 period. The loans from Spain were 
meanly for the sectors of transportation, water and sanitation and vocational training. However, 
according to Toro (2016) the relation between Spain and Venezuela is mainly commercial. And 
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there aren’t registries of allocation of more loans from Spain to Venezuela. As the description of 
table 16 shows, these loans were allocated to areas different from oil and mining which contrasts 
to the Chinese and Russian loans that target the areas of infrastructure and oil production.  
Table 16: ODA Loans from Spain to Venezuela 1999-2014105 US Dollar Millions 
Year Amount Sector 
1999 - - 
2000 - - 
2001 - - 
2002 24.136 Not specified 
2003 45.111 Transportation and storage 
2004 0.513 Vocational Training: secondary 
education. 
2005 2.237 Vocational training: secondary 
education; River basins’ development: 
water and sanitation. 
2006 5.384 Vocational training: secondary 
education; River basins’ development: 
water and sanitation. 
2007 6.156 River basins’ development: water and 
sanitation. 
2008 1.414 River basins’ development: water and 
sanitation. 
2009 -  
2010 -  
2011 -  
2012 -  
2013 -  
2014 -  
Total 84.951 
Source: OECD Data Base 2016106. 
 Even though the loans from China, Russia, Japan and Spain represented an increase in the 
exports of Venezuelan oil to these destinations, as is shown in figure 9, Russia is the country that 
has imported most oil from Venezuela during 1999-2012 and China and Japan incremented their 
imports in the mid-2000s.  
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Figure 9. Venezuelan Oil Exports to China, Russia, Spain and Japan 1999-2012 
 
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Statistics 2016. 
 
III-C Venezuela’s increasing Debt to China and the Transformation of their Relations 
 As noted above, China has become the principal lender of Venezuela, especially since 2007 
when the two countries created the Chinese-Venezuelan Fund and the loans from China to 
Venezuela increased considerably. Through the method of payment, Venezuela is compromised 
to supply oil to China in order to cancel the debts. Even though, by 2015 more than half of the debt 
was cancelled, the constant renovation of loans from China indicate that the oil compromises will 
extend for a long period of time.  
China and Venezuela established bilateral relations in June of 1974 and according to the 
Venezuelan Embassy in China, the relations between the two countries increased with the 
emergence of the Bolivarian Revolution, meaning with the arrival of Chávez to power. In an 
Embassy note is stated that by 1999 there were only 30 cooperation agreements between the two 
countries, however, by 2015 there have been signed around 500 agreements. These agreements 
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Bolívar in 2008 and Francisco de Miranda in 2012. In the same note is emphasized that one of the 
objectives of Maduro’s administration is to reach over a million barrels of oil exported to China, 
“in order to diversify the foreign markets of the country and to respect the international 
compromises”107.  
Just as Venezuela was fostering dependency among its borrowers, the country developed 
a dependency over China, which became its main loan provider. According to the article “How 
Much Venezuela Depends on China” by Daniel Pardo108, in the 17 years of Chávez government 
the military, political, social and economic relation between China and Venezuela grew 
considerably. In the article is stated that since 1999, China and Venezuela signed over 450 
agreements, in contrast to 74 signed in the period 1974-1998109. However, China has not supersede 
the United States as the principal commercial partner of Venezuela; the United States imports 
around 800.000 oil barrels per day whereas China imports from 300.000 to 600.000 barrels per 
day. As is seen in figure 10, even though oil exports to China incremented especially since 2002 
and the exports to the United States diminished between 1999 and 2004, the oil exports to the US 
increased again since 2006. Nonetheless, according to Maduro’s declarations in 2015 Venezuela 
is exporting around 700.000 barrels of oil daily to China110.  
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Figure 10. Total Exports of Refined Oil Products from Venezuela to China and the United 
States 1986-2016 (Thousand barrels/day) 
 
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Statistics 2016. 
 
In order to determine the hierarchical relations between China and Venezuela it is 
necessary to understand the level of dependency of China on Venezuelan oil and the loans 
cancellation and debts that these two countries have. First, the relation between both countries is 
more important to Venezuela than to China mainly for two reasons: China is providing cash funds 
that Venezuela needs to cover its expenses and that other countries are not willing to provide due 
to Venezuela’s high level of debt; and even though China accorded to receive Venezuelan 
payments on oil, this country has other sources to get this resource from, moreover, according to 
Clem and Maingot (2011) Venezuelan oil is not that attractive to China because “of the realities 
of distance and transportation costs…and the need for special refineries to process the heavy 
Venezuelan crude, China’s reliance on Middle Eastern oil will actually increase over time” (Clem 
and Maingot 2011: 9). As figure 11 shows, Venezuela only represented 4% of China’s oil imports 














Figure 11. China’s Crude Oil Imports by Source, 2014 
 
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, “China” 2015111 
 
Second, the increasing economic crisis in Venezuela is making the country less able to 
fulfill its debts compromises. In February of 2016 the administration of Maduro asked China for a 
grace period of two years in order to pay the debt to the country, this request happened in “moments 
when Venezuelan oil prices were around USD$23 per barrel, below the USD$40 stipulated in the 
debt terms of USD$50,000 million that the Bolivarian regime assumed with Pekin…Caracas is 
trying to use the more than 500,000 barrels that are sent to China to sell them in other markets”112. 
According to a news report in the Nuevo Herald, the Chinese government denied to this request, 
moreover, “China insists that Venezuela increases the supply of barrels of oil in order to pay the 
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near US$45,000 million in debt…China is skeptic to continue its credit to Venezuela due to the 
hard situation of Venezuelan finances and because China is facing their own economic 
problems”113. In a news report to the BBC Mundo114, the director of the China-Latin America 
Inter-American Diaologue, Margaret Myers, states that Chinese investment is pragmatic and 
economic and not ideological, however, China faces a dilemma because on the one side the country 
wants to recover its loans and on the other side is conscious of the weakness of Venezuela at the 
moment; Myers asserts that ‘it is important to note, however, that Venezuela is for China an 
strategic alliance due to its petroleum reserves.’ In the article is also pointed out that China might 
want to continue its investment in the production of oil in order to reinforce its source of 
repayment.  
Even though China agreed a loan to Venezuela in 2015 for USD$5,000 million, the main 
purpose of this credit is to “increase the production of oil in a gradual manner, which had been 
stocked in the last years,” according to declarations to the press by the Venezuelan president115. 
However, it is important to note that even though China has more leverage over Venezuela, the 
Asian country seems to see in Venezuela and South America in general an important source of 
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energy, material resources and fertile lands resources that they need for their rapid development 
and vast population116.  
 As noted in the previous section, the loan-for-oil type of credit arranged between 
Venezuela and China becomes counterproductive under a scenario of plunging oil prices, which 
means that Venezuela has to send more oil to China to compensate the difference and also it has 
less oil available to sell on the market. According to a CNN news report, the Chinese president Xi 
Jinping made an official visit to Venezuela in July of 2014 during which the two countries signed 
other 38 agreements for a total of 450 bilateral covenants since 1999 until 2014. One of those 
agreements included a new loan for US$4,000 million to be paid with 100.000 barrels of oil daily. 
With these new agreements, the “goal was to double the supply of Venezuelan oil to China by 
2016”117. 
 Through the allocation of Chinese loans not only increased the exports of oil from 
Venezuela to China but also the exports from China to Venezuela. In a news report by El Nacional 
is stated that small local industries are stopping to produce in order to become importers, the 
“Chinese are the second exporters to Venezuela after the United States”118. The imports include 
appliances, clothes, car pieces and more which come from the Chinese city Canton. Between 2007 
and 2012 the imports from China to Venezuela were worth around US$4,000 million, “more than 
half corresponds to electronic appliances, textiles, shoes and accessories. As figure 12 shows, the 
exports from China to Venezuela incremented considerably after 2005 and especially during 2012.  
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Figure 12. Imports from China to Venezuela 1998-2014 (FBO US$) 
 
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas [National Institute of Statistics] Sistema de Consulta 
de Estadísticas de Comercio Exterior Importaciones 2016119.  
 
 Perhaps it is still soon to assert the changes in the relation between the two countries, but 
what cannot be denied is that China and Venezuela have incremented their commercial relations. 
However, the Venezuelan-Chinese relation is going to be determined by Venezuelan capability to 
pay off its accruing debt.  
III-D How loans to Venezuela transform hierarchical relations with its borrowers? 
The principal implication for Venezuela as lender and borrower is that the country is 
caught-up in a zero-sum situation: since Venezuela allocates loans through subsidized oil and pays 
its debt with oil as well, the country would have less oil to supply its borrowers and less resources 
to provide substantial subsides. Thus, the hierarchical relation between Venezuela and its 
borrowers is transformed by the conditionality of the loans assumed by Venezuela which curtail 
the country’s ability to fulfill its lending obligations.  
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According to the analysis of the economic journalist Andres Rojas (2015), the energy 
agreements (especially Petro Caribe) have considerably increased Venezuelan accounts receivable 
due to the lack of payment from its borrowers. Venezuelan annual concession of loans increased 
from USD$961 million in 1998 to USD$1183 million in 2014, as the following table shows.  
Table 17. Venezuela Concession of Loans 1999-2014 
 
Year 























Source: Rojas 2015120.  
In Rojas’s analysis there are two important emphasized points: first that Venezuela has 
diminished its supply of oil to its borrowers; and second the lack of payments and debt forgiveness 
to the borrowers. He asserts that the accumulated commercial loans linked to oil ascend to 
USD$35.968 million between 2005 and 2014; even though Venezuela established an oil quota of 
376,000 barrels per day, this quota was not always fulfilled and by 2014 it showed a decreased of 
17.5% in regards to 2013, which meant that only 198,300 barrels per day were allocated; as table 
18 shows, the biggest reduction was in the supply to Dominican Republic. This decreased in oil 
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barrels began in 2012 due to the fiscal and currency problems that Venezuela was facing. In 
Rojas’s article is stated that 2012 was the hiked point of oil exports reaching 400.000 barrels per 
day, however, that same year Venezuela was only receiving the cash payment of 200.000 barrels. 
Before 2005 (the year of Petro Caribe implementation), the loans offered by PDVSA and other 
public institutions was around US$683 million per year but by 2014 that number increased to 
USD$3.596 million121.  
Table 18. Reduction of Barrels of Oil through Credit-Source 
Country Quota of Daily Barrels Supplied in 2014 Supplied in 2013 Reduction % 
Antigua & Barbuda 4.400 900 1100 -18,1 
Belize 4.000 2.400 2600 -7,6 
Dominica 1.000 300 300 0 
El Salvador 7.000 5.900 6.400 14,2 
Granada 1.000 800 700 0 
Guatemala 20.000 0 0 4,5 
Guyana 5.200 4.600 4.400 -2,8 
Haiti 14.000 13.600 14.000 0 
Honduras 20.000 0 0 -19,7 
Jamaica 23.500 17.900 22.300 -18,5 
Dominican Republic 30.000 23.300 28.600 -33,3 
St. Cristobal & Nieves 1.200 600 900 0 
St. Vincent & Grenadines 1.000 500 500 0,03 
Surinam 10.000 3.400 3.300 0,03 
Cuba 98.000 89.400 99.300 -9,9 
Source: Rojas, Andres 2015. 
The accumulated Cuban oil-related debt with Venezuela was about USD$4.975 billion in 
2009, equaling 24% of all oil cooperation receivable accounts of Petróleos de Venezuela 
(PDVSA)” (Romero 2010: 110). As noted before, Cuba has a barter mechanism with Venezuela 
through which Venezuela pays Cuban workers with the supply of barrels of oil to Cuba, however, 
since the drop in oil prices in 2011 “the numbers of the island indicate that the value of Cuban 
workers (medical doctors, teachers or consultants) is much greater than the value of the oil…in 
2012 Cuba had a trade surplus with Venezuelan commerce of USD$6 million,” and since the 
                                                          




Venezuelan oil is paid with Cuban services that could be reducing the debt from Cuba to 
Venezuela. However, “the important thing is not the debt but the fact that Venezuela is sending oil 
to Cuba which is being paid with overvalued services”122. For instance, there are estimations that 
account that each Cuban doctor has a cost of USD$90,000 per month123. In contrast to Cuba’s 
surplus in its barter relation with Venezuela, Colonel asserts that the oil agreements between 
Venezuela and Cuba signed in 2000 represent a great deficit for the Venezuelan state: “the form 
of payment, including 15-year financing at 2% interest of 25% of the volume, is a gift to Cuba that 
can be estimated at some USD$400 million per year at current oil prices…In total, therefore, 
Venezuela is giving Cuba a subsidy on the order of USD$2.2 billion to USD$2.3 billion per year” 
(Coronel 2006: 12). Because neither country reveals clearly the function and terms of their trade, 
it is difficult to distinguish what is aid and what are loans. For instance, with a debt from Cuba to 
Venezuela of USD$1.93 million, “there is no knowledge of under what conditions those ‘solidarity 
loans’ were agreed”124. Putting aside the barter between oil and services, Cuba has not made liquid 
payments towards its debt with Venezuela.  
Aside from Cuba’s situation, by 2015 Dominican Republic became the principal debtor of 
Venezuela due to the allocation of oil under credit through Petro Caribe, in the same way PDVSA 
became Dominican Republic’s main creditor to the point that it represents the fourth part of the 
Dominican external debt. By 2014, Dominican Republic owed a total of USD$4.121 million which 
indicates a debt growth of 9.310% in 10 years; this means that the debt with Venezuela grew 94 
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times in one decade. In order to diminish this debt compensation mechanism such as the import of 
goods and the participation of PDVSA in the Dominican oil industry Refineria Dominicana de 
Petroleo (REFIDOMSA), of which PDVSA acquired the 49%125.  
As can be noted in table 19, after 10 years of its implementation, the Petro Caribe 
agreement represented 25,6% of the total external public debt of the Dominican Republic. 
However, in 2015, the Dominican government paid the 98.5% of its debt to PDVSA. Dominican 
Republic paid with resources of sovereign bonds of US$2.5 million. The government announced 
that with this payment they obtained a discount of 52% of the total debt (which represents a saving 
of US$2.094.2 million) accrued during the period 2005-2014. Through this payment, Dominican 
Republic reduced its debt to PDVSA to US$96.5 million by 2015126. The Dominican minister of 
Hacienda asserted that this transaction was beneficial for both countries: the Dominican external 
debt was immediately reduced by 3.3% of the country GDP and the period of payment for the 
remaining debt is of 19.7 years instead of 11 years, which is going to be attractive to international 
investors and the IMF; meanwhile PDVSA acquired a liquid fund of USD1.93 million127. 
According to Rojas this decision was made because of the pressures of the IMF that advised the 
Dominican Republic of the danger of not assuming this debt. Rojas also points out that the saving 
of the Dominican government meant that PDVSA only recovered 48% of the amount owed by 
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Dominican Republic. Also, this concession of forgiving more than half of the Petro Caribe debt 
was later emulated by other countries members of the agreement such as Jamaica128.  
Table 19. Dominican Republic’s External Debt in Relation to its Petro Caribe Debt 
Year Petro Caribe Debt 
Amount (US$MM) 
Amount of External 
Debt (US$MM) 
Relation of the 
Petro Caribe 
Debt/Dominican 
External Debt (%) 
2004 0 6,379,7 0 
2005 159,5 5,847,1 2,7 
2006 448,8 6,295,5 7,1 
2007 702,7 6,555,6 10,8 
2008 1,232,6 7,218,8 17,1 
2009 1,466,8 8,214,6 17,9 
2010 1,849,5 9,946,9 18,6 
2011 2,384,5 11,625,6 20,5 
2012 3,029,9 12,871 23,5 
2013 1752 14,919,4 24,7 
2014 3,686,4 16,074,5 25,6 
Source: Rojas 2015.  
 In the same year, Jamaica followed Dominican Republic steps and paid its oil debt of 
USD$3,000 million to Venezuela through sovereign bonds and with a discount of 53%. After 
negotiations with Caracas, “Venezuela cancelled US$3,000 million of the Jamaican debt in 
exchange of one single payment of USD$1,500 million…however, the authorities did not specify 
if this payment covered the whole Petro Caribbean debt from Jamaica”129. This measure was part 
of an agreement of Jamaica and the IMF in order to reduce the weight of its external public debt 
which by 2015 was around 145% of its GDP130. The decision of Venezuela to accept the debt 
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payments by conferring onerous discounts is linked to its urgency of foreign exchange in order to 
confront the local economic situation; however, “it is important to note the difference between real 
debt and nominal debt in order to estimate the amount that Venezuela is losing with these 
transactions…even though the debt has a nominal value of USD$3,500 million, its real value is 
around USD$2,500 million…taking the debt real value, Venezuela would be losing USD$1,000 
million”131.  
 Venezuela’s own debt, which had to be paid off with oil supply, affected its role as lender 
because the country asked for its payments before the time stipulated in the Petro Caribe 
agreement, also having to concede onerous discounts to its debtors and diminishing the amount of 
oil destined for the Caribbean and Central America.  
IV. Conclusions 
There were two factors that drove Venezuela to ask for foreign loans: first is the over trust 
in having oil as the main source of revenue by assuming that its prices and exports will lead to 
enough surplus to sustain ample spending. Paradoxically, the second factor is precisely having oil 
as the principal commodity of the economy which makes it vulnerable to the volatility of oil prices. 
For instance, in the mid-1970s the high oil prices gave trust to the Venezuelan administration to 
ask for loans abroad in order to develop local projects; however, the oil prices went down and the 
country had to recur to more loans in order to cover its deficits and debts. These loans came mainly 
from multilateral institutions, such as the IMF, which proposed unpopular economic reforms. 
During the Chávez’s regime similar economic situations took place but the political context called 
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for different lenders. Since Chávez was openly declared against the mainstream economic order, 
his administration did not recur to multilateral organizations that could have the influence of the 
United States behind them. Instead, Chávez’s regime used bilateral loans from alternative lenders 
such as China and Russia, being China its principal provider. Yet, the main distinction of the 
money borrowed by Venezuela during the 2000s is that their payment would be made with barrels 
of oil. Under the loan-for-oil type of loans, China and Venezuela seemed to develop a mutual 
beneficial relation: China provided the cash that Venezuela urgently needed and Venezuela 
compromised to provide oil to China until the debt was paid off. However, as already explained 
that exchange of oil for money resulted counter-productive for Venezuela due to the decreasing 
oil prices and the terms of the Chinese loan agreements: Venezuela had to allocate extra barrels of 
oil to compensate the difference which meant that it would have less amount to sell to its traditional 
customers (being the United States its principal importer).  
Through the allocation of these loans, China and Venezuela increased their commercial 
and diplomatic relations which was reflected on the more than 400 agreements signed between the 
two countries since 2001. Some analysts show concern in the level of dependency that Venezuela 
is creating towards China through the allocation of loans-for-oil, especially since China has more 
leverage on Venezuela than Venezuela on China. Even though China is highly interested in 
Venezuelan oil and the country runs the risk of not being paid back, China has other sources to get 
its oil from. In contrast, China has become Venezuela’s biggest lender, especially since 
Venezuela’s international economic standing limits its access to the mainstream market. Even 
though other countries such as Russia and Japan have lent to Venezuela, they do not lend at the 




more concessional the loans are, the more the recipient would borrow and the more indebted it will 
get.  
Since the loan-for-oil agreement has a double repercussion of increasing Venezuela’s 
dependency on China and decreasing its dominance over its borrowers, it can be said that 
Venezuela fell on its own trap. Having to allocate more oil to pay its debts means that Venezuela 
has less oil to allocate to its other clients, which was the case of the Petro Caribe members as 
demonstrated by Rojas’ analysis. Yet, the biggest impact is the urgent need of cash reflected in the 
discounts that Venezuela made to the Dominican Republic and Jamaica in order to receive early 
payments from the Petro Caribe debt. Since loans are an economic exchange that creates a relation 
of domination while the debt is in place, this early payment from Dominican Republic and Jamaica 
could be interpreted in three forms. First, by the early payment with the onerous discount from 
Venezuela’s side, the borrowers have a moral gratitude with Venezuela because that discount can 
be assumed as a grant component. Conversely this situation could be interpreted as the borrowers 
having leverage on its lender, Venezuela had an urgent need for cash which was provided by its 
borrowers who according to the terms agreement had a longer period of time to make the payment. 
And third, the early payment of the debt just signifies the end of the relation between Venezuela 









III. General Conclusions 
 Since loans are an economic exchange which if are paid the relation of domination between 
lender and borrower does not take place, being a lender and borrower simultaneously affected the 
hierarchical relation mostly between Venezuela and its borrowers. However, the biggest influence 
of the relation between Venezuela and its borrowers and lenders is conditioned by the terms of the 
received and given loans. The conditionality of the loans borrowed by Venezuela, the cash-for oil 
type of loan, implied less oil to allocate abroad and less economic solvency to subsidize its oil 
supply. Through Venezuelan energy agreements, the country sells oil under concessional prices 
meaning that its borrowers have extended periods of time to complete their payments and they 
receive subsidies depending on the oil prices. Thus, Venezuela’s borrowers can end the debt by 
paying the money for the product that they received; so already did Dominican Republic and 
Jamaica which bought sovereign bonds to cancel their debts with Venezuela. In contrast, the loans 
that Venezuela receives from China have the payment method inverted; China provides Venezuela 
with money and Venezuela provides China with oil through fixed quotas (even though they can 
increase if the price of oil descend) for a determined period of time. This means that Venezuela 
could not emulate Dominican Republic or Jamaica by buying cash to cancel its debt with China; 
it is not likely that Venezuela would produce all the barrels of oil at once and send them to China 
because that implies that they would not have oil left to sell in the market. For instance, when the 
administration of Maduro asked China to reduce the supply of oil allocated for the debt payment, 
China’s administration denied the petition because at the end oil is the only guarantee of their 
payments. Since the payment of debts vanish the patron-client relation, because the states are not 




can be said that the relation of domination of China over Venezuela is stronger than the relation 
between Venezuela and its borrowers.  
 However, it has to be noted Venezuela’s achievements through its energy agreements and 
through the creation of ALBA-TCP. Since the mid-1970s Venezuela was providing alternatives 
for non-oil small states through the allocation of oil under cheaper prices than the market and 
facilities such as grace periods and extended time to make the payments. In 2000 these agreements 
were taken to another level through the Chávez’s administration by incrementing the benefits for 
the borrowers and creating international blocs through the schemes of ALBA-TCP and Petro 
Caribe. In both agreements the Venezuelan state had the leadership as the main provider for the 
rest of the states. Even though Venezuela not always received the international support of the 
members of these agreements, a space was created which allowed commercial exchange and 
promoted to a certain degree Venezuela’s political economy. For instance, only state owned oil 
industries could participate in the Petro Caribe agreement, moreover, through the creation of joint 
ventures the Venezuelan state bought shares of the oil industries of its borrowers. This corroborate 
the point made by Benzi (2013) who asserts that one of the Venezuelan strategies was to break the 
monopoly of transnational oil corporations. Yet, the most relevant demonstration of the scope of 
ALBA-TCP and Petro Caribe is the space that they created for Cuba, country alienated from 
international commerce through the American trade embargo. Beside the direct financial aid that 
Cuba received from Venezuela, through ALBA-TCP the Caribbean country found an alternative 
space for international trade in which its human capital became its principal exportation.  At the 
same time that Venezuela promotes alternative practices in international relations through its 
lending practices, so it does through its role as a borrower. China is a relatively new lender in Latin 




the resources of the region and their lack of conditionality for the allocation of loans; thus, 
Venezuela as borrower also seeks alternatives outside the mainstream market.  
IV. Deficiencies of the Study and Further Implications 
The major deficiency of this study is the limited access to Venezuelan official statistics 
regarding the amount of its given and received loans. Moreover, being a situation under 
development (because until 2016 Venezuela continues its agreements of Petro Caribe and ALBA-
TCP and also continues renovating its loans with China), this thesis had to rely on news article and 
independent reports for the amounts, terms and purposes of the loans allocated from China to 
Venezuela and the developments of the Venezuelan energy agreements.  
The topic of Venezuela as lender and borrower has many layers that deserve scholarly 
attention. For instance, the relation between Cuba and Venezuela is a topic that can be study 
further, considering that through the ALBA-TCP bloc and the barter system both countries created 
an alternative avenue of trade. Since this study focused on the loans from Venezuela to the 
Caribbean and Central America, a further study could incorporate the loans agreements between 
Venezuela and other countries of South America such as Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia and Ecuador 
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